


JPRS-TAC-92-016  
18 MAY 1992



FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE

# ***JPRS Report***

## **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-016

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**Russia, France Urge U.S. To Suspend Tests**

*OW2804221992 Beijing XINHUA in English  
2023 GMT 28 Apr 92*

[Text] Moscow, April 28 (XINHUA)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin said today that his country would join hands with France to pressure the United States into suspending nuclear tests, ITAR-TASS reported.

Russia would neither allow any harm done to its national security and nor allow the United States to enjoy superiority to it in nuclear arms, Yeltsin said while touring Severodvinsk, a satellite town of the Arkhangelsk City in north-west Russia.

Russia would continue to suspend its nuclear tests, which had won support from France, he said.

The president noted that his official visit to Washington in June would "include negotiations either on complete ban on nuclear tests, or on their minimum level and quantity—for instance, two explosions a year, not 17 as it was planned."

Yeltsin began his four-city tour today and his first stop is Severodvinsk, where major Russian plants involved in producing nuclear-powered subs are located.

## JAPAN

**Hiroshima Mayor Protests U.S. Nuclear Test**

OW0105054192 Tokyo KYODO in English 0340 GMT  
1 May 92

[Text] Hiroshima, May 1 KYODO—Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka lodged a protest Friday at a nuclear

weapons test conducted Thursday by the United States at its testing site in Nevada.

The mayor's office said Hiraoka sent a letter of protest to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost in Tokyo.

Hiroshima was the first city to suffer a nuclear attack when the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on it on August 6, 1945.

## INDIA

### Analyst Urges Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

92WC0046A *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA*  
in English 21 Mar 92 p 11

[Article by Praful Bidwai: "Pressure Mounts on Indian for NPT"]

[Text] New Delhi, March 20. The remarks of Mr. Richard Bartholomew, the U.S. undersecretary of state for international security affairs, during a satellite television conference last Wednesday, suggested that pressure continues to mount on New Delhi to take concrete steps towards nuclear restraint in South Asia.

Unless the government of India responds to this relentless pressure by making a comprehensive and realistic counter-proposal, it is likely to get further isolated on the nuclear issue.

Such a counter-proposal should require some effort on the part of all five nuclear weapons states for arms limitation and visible reduction, as well as joint initiatives by India and Pakistan, or some variant of a five-nation conference. Perhaps the best form of the first will be a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

During the teleconference linking Washington, New Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing, Mr. Bartholomew emphasised that the United States still regards the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) as a valid ultimate objective and the most appropriate arrangement for the region. A five-nation conference, a nuclear-safe zone arrangement, or some agreement on nuclear restraint in the region can only be a means to that end.

This is manifestly at odds with the well-articulated recent U.S. position on the issue, conveyed to Indian officials repeatedly, albeit not publicly, viz, that America acknowledges New Delhi's grave reservations on the NPT but wants India to make an alternative nuclear restraint proposal.

Evidently, Mr. Bartholomew resorted to a well-practised variety of pressure tactics which become comprehensive in the aftermath of the foreign secretary, Mr. J. N. Dixit's recent visit to the United States. That visit was a failure insofar as it widened rather than narrowed Indo-U.S. differences on the issue.

Mr. Dixit was in fact unable to formulate an alternative to the five-nation conference idea proposed last June by Pakistan.

New Delhi has been unable to dispel the impression that it is merely stone-walling and resisting a reasonable move, that it does not respect the validity of concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and that it is resorting to doctrinaire arguments against the NPT only because it wishes to become a nuclear weapons power. This, and the failure to propose a

concrete alternative—at least as the premise for further talks—has exposed the country to greater pressure.

All this has happened within months of the implicit U.S. assessment (reflected in presidential noncertification under the Pressler amendment) that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons capability, if not the weapon itself.

The shift in the U.S. position—itself probably more the result of changes in power equations in West and South Asia than of Pakistan's true status—opened an opportunity for India to convey its security concerns to the United States and to work towards a new arrangement in the region that would allow for greater mutual confidence and security, even while making the sub-continent "nuclear-safe" (on the basis of an agreement for the non-use of nuclear weapons), if not nuclear weapons free.

The opportunity was reinforced by evidence of Pakistan's involvement in exacerbating the separatist movement in the Kashmir Valley.

There is every danger that the opportunity will be quickly lost. Doctrinaire hardliners in this country, who do not appreciate the gravity of non-proliferation concerns worldwide have worked overtime to ensure that this happens. At the same time, anti-proliferation hawks in the West, in particular the United States stand to gain the most from the collapse of efforts for nuclear restraint in South Asia, other than in the form of the NPT.

If a five-nation conference, or an alternative such as a nuclear weapons-free zone or a nuclear-safe region, or some other kind of restraint, does not succeed, the pressure in favour of the NPT will become unbearable.

At any rate, Mr. Bartholomew's remarks should put paid to one other ludicrous idea that has gained some currency of late, viz that India could sign the NPT, but as a nuclear weapons state and that, thanks to its new proximity to the United States it can persuade the Americans to amend the treaty, so that it can acknowledge the Pokhran explosion of 1974 as signifying the acquisition of a nuclear weapon status.

This idea betrays legal illiteracy on international treaties. It is totally unacceptable politically in a situation marked by growing proliferation concerns, as well as major successes on the NPT front (exemplified by China and France's accession to it), rising pressures on Iraq and North Korea, and the Brazil-Argentina agreement. And there is no way a treaty signed by 142 countries can be severely amended by a declaration of India that Pokhran was not the peaceful explosion it had been claimed to be.

India has all along argued that the NPT is an unfair treaty, which legitimises the possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of states and imposes unequal objections upon them and the nuclear have-nots. The government cannot possibly sign the treaty, without

losing credibility worldwide and violating a strong domestic consensus built over the years.

At the same time, however, it must be seen to be making serious and meaningful moves in the direction of denuclearisation of the region, even as it seeks to tie up that effort with a larger, global initiative.

The latter cannot be adequate at the level of long-term plans of the Rajiv Gandhi variety. In order to give it immediacy and a practical character, it must draw the nuclear powers into a concrete agreement for restraint.

One such agreement, and one favoured historically by large numbers of disarmament specialists and activists, could be a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). This will impose a total ban on all tests of nuclear weapons under all conditions. India and Pakistan could offer to undertake far reaching mutual restraint, while at the same time the nuclear powers and the threshold states agree to a CTBT.

Indeed, India and Pakistan could offer not to add to their stockpiles, for a specified period of time, any fissile material at all, if a CTBT is signed. This will remove at one go the basic asymmetry between regional and global disarmament initiatives and meet India's insistence that genuine disarmament must be supra-regional.

A CTBT will put paid to star wars and all high-tech anti-ballistic missile programmes. It will also make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nuclear

weapons to be refined or miniaturised. It will represent a substantial gain in itself and could also lead to even larger cuts in the world's nuclear arsenals—with enough warheads to destroy the globe perhaps a hundred times over. A CTBT will invest the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone with new potential and possibilities.

A CTBT is likely to carry a great deal of moral and political weight in the West where the peace sentiment is by no means unimportant. Now that the cold war has ended and the Soviet threat does not exist, the whole idea of vertical proliferation or making nuclear weapons more sophisticated and powerful, and of keeping the arms race going, has been deprived of its rationale. Thus, India will find allies in the form of the peace movement and moderates and liberals in the west.

Equally importantly, a CTBT-regional nuclear restraint link will permit India to seize the initiative, instead of merely responding in an uncertain, diffident, contradictory and floundering way to other proposals. And last but not least, it will allow India to explore ways of moving forward on nuclear proliferation without being subjected to pressure, coercion and blackmail.

Here lies the key to the long-term success of any restraint agreement: anything done under duress is likely to fall apart; only a voluntary, honourable and equitable arrangement can meet objections about excessive erosion of national sovereignty.

## GENERAL

### 'Military Expert' on Statistical Danger of Nuclear Weapons Accident

924P0124A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 15, Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Speaking Unofficially About Official Matters—Missiles Are 'Kicking up Dust' on the Roads"]

[Text] In the opinion of military expert P.G. Belov, the probability of an accident with an individual nuclear warhead is one in 10 million each year. If we consider that we have more than 30,000 warheads, and they have been in service for more than 30 years, then this ratio will be 1 in 100.

The most dangerous types of armaments for our population are the PS-22 and PS-12M mobile-based missiles. The housing of such missiles contains a nuclear charge, conventional explosives, self-igniting toxic substances, and chemical sources of electrical current. This "assortment" does not, unfortunately, remain in one place; they are "kicking up dust" along our highways and railroads.

Ten instances have been recorded where such missiles have tipped over. There were plenty of preconditions for an explosion—a hot engine, spilled fuel, a short circuit, and fire. Moreover, there is nothing with which to extinguish it; only two fire extinguishers on the carriage were put in use. And in case of fire personnel are supposed to remove themselves to a distance of 600 meters. That is according to the written instructions...

Here is an interesting detail. During the talks on reduction of nuclear weapons the Americans did not insist on elimination of these missiles. Perhaps this was because they are much more dangerous to us than to the Americans and their allies.

### Weapons Scientist Reflects on Past, Future

PM2104154892 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Yevgeniy Negin, general and academician, by Vladimir Gubarev, datelined Arzamas-16 and Moscow; date not given: "Nuclear Sunset: Conversation with General and Academician Ye. Negin on Atomic Weapons—Their Past, Present, and Future"—first two and final two paragraphs are Gubarev introduction and postscript]

[Excerpts] Arzamas-16—Moscow—I first met with Yevgeniy Arkadyevich in the desert. We were unable to talk at the time: A furious gas gusher was making such a hell of a row that after a few minutes my ears were blocked and we could only communicate by gestures. [passage omitted]

But now I was greeted by not just General Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin, but Academician Negin. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] Yevgeniy Arkadyevich, what do nuclear weapons mean to you?

[Negin] Don't expect a simple answer. On the one hand, I am very familiar with this area. At least the technical aspect of it. And I was working in it until the last day of my service. On the other hand, I appreciate that nuclear weapons are devices to which there is no alternative—in the sense of their effect upon the surrounding world. I appreciate that mankind is far from perfectly organized, that it has been divided, and remains divided today too, I think, into at least two camps (I don't what to call them now, but previously they were socialism and capitalism). We have still not entered into the kind of relationship with America that means we can embrace each other on every corner and disarm ourselves for all to see. So long as America has nuclear weapons, I think that we should have them too. And as I "made it" to where the weapons are produced, I consider it my duty to work with top efficiency. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] What spheres of science has this technology stimulated, in your view?

[Negin] The most diverse spheres! First, medium-energy physics. It has made extraordinary progress. Then the theory of explosions and detonation. [passage omitted] Incidentally, a virtually new instrument-making industry has been created and it has matched world standards to date. Heavens, I forgot computing! I should have started with that...It cannot be said that a bomb is designed as such, because theoretical physicists first have to do all the calculation and computations. Therefore the development of computers in our country came in the first instance from us...Incidentally, there were no machines here during the initial stage, the calculations were done manually.... However, we have always lagged behind the Americans in terms of the power and speed of computers.

[Gubarev] And in nuclear weapons in general?

[Negin] If there is a gap, it is a negligible one. And in some areas we are ahead....

[Gubarev] Don't secrets get stolen?

[Negin] It is not easy...Incidentally, there is a worldwide stir being raised: They say that a kilogram of enriched uranium-235 has been discovered somewhere. And they frighten everyone by saying that a bomb is being made! But you need 10-15 times that quantity of this uranium to have a bomb rather than mere playing around...It must be understood that our industry is extraordinarily sophisticated and costly, it demands incredible effort and a powerful industrial base.

[Gubarev] When did you first attend tests?

[Negin] It was in 1953...I had to travel to the test range. We sat down on a knoll. We put on dark glasses, and then heard "zero." My first impression was that I was looking at a furnace. It was 31 km away, but I clearly felt the heat on my face. It was my first impression of its power...Giant clouds then rose up, ascending to somewhere in the stratosphere....

[Gubarev] Was your interest purely professional?

[Negin] There's no escaping the emotion. Although, of course, you are waiting to see: Will it work, or not? Sometimes it didn't come off...There is professional satisfaction if the experiment works. That is natural.

[Gubarev] Did you often attend explosions?

[Negin] I attended virtually all the explosions carried out by our institute. I was the scientific leader at about half of them. So I have seen more than enough. In the latter half of my test activity I was able to determine the yield pretty accurately by eye, but for some reason I was never included on the list of physical instruments...However, talking about myself, and with complete seriousness, I do not regret having devoted my life—and I am now 72—to this problem. I think that we did put off World War III. For a long time or not—I don't know, but at least for the time that has elapsed. We managed to maintain parity in a pretty skillful way, and every time they (if you believe the newspapers, that is) decided on a nuclear attack, it was countermanded precisely because a new kind of weapon emerged in our country which rendered an attack disadvantageous or its success dubious...No one intends to attack us because of parity, but the situation could change if we lose it. And I have no certainty that this won't happen. Everyone says: "disarmament, disarmament, disarmament..." I am convinced that the Americans are not thinking about true disarmament. They realize that excessive weapons have been produced—so many weapons are not needed...To destroy 70 percent of America's industrial potential you need 500 missiles, 700 at most. And even fewer if they have multiple warheads...We should understand that we would not survive either! Even at this level war becomes senseless, because there will be no victor or vanquished. There are incomparably more weapons than this today, and consequently they must be reduced. But if we disarm unilaterally, we will be saying: "Come and get us, guys, we are lying on our backs with our legs in the air..." The Pentagon recently stated: Missiles are targeted on us and they stay targeted, they won't be turned away. I have the impression that they have not changed. That they have altered the terminology a little is another matter; they use different jargon, but inside they stay the same. It is no wonder that they are offering to dismantle our nuclear weapons....

[Gubarev] And why not take this up?

[Negin] Nonprofessionals are discussing nuclear weapons! In the Ukraine they are saying: We will construct a plant in the Chernobyl zone, first we will dismantle nuclear weapons there, and then we will

reprocess waste materials. Bunkum, such nonsense! To dismantle weapons you need a machine plant, you need to turn nuts, while waste products require a chemical production unit. And they have nothing in common! When I read this, I swore, and threw the newspaper away....

[Gubarev] This most likely concerns the possession of plutonium?

[Negin] It must be safeguarded. Why can't you store it in ordinary containers [banki], for example? You would collect them all together and, if something goes awry, the whole lot of the plutonium would blow sky-high. In other words, we need special storage depots and containers. We have learned how to make them—and with complete safety. And we can even give the Americans a few tips...Now the process of disarmament has started up and such containers and storage facilities have to be made. But everything is upside down: First we bring the stuff in and collect it together, and only then do we start thinking about storing it.

[Gubarev] Can weapons be improved without tests?

[Negin] Certain hotheads seek to persuade us that they can—everything is computable. But that only applies if we repeat the past, duplicate things. But we won't create a single fundamentally new idea or make a single more reliable or safer weapon. The end of tests therefore essentially means the end of our activity.

A word or two about tests. I am convinced that they can be carried out absolutely safely. Again there have been attempts to make savings, that is to say, slightly smaller charges at a little less depth. We have begun working "at the limit." A gas escape did take place. Incidentally, the Americans paid in the same way. The gases instantly dispersed, there was no danger, but the fact is that there was an escape. It is simply necessary to work competently! We can work without tests, we can produce blueprints and shelve them, but everyone should understand that there will be no new weapons.

Do understand me correctly: I have no objection—let us destroy nuclear weapons completely! But let us do it together—we and the Americans.

[Gubarev] The French, the British, and the Chinese will remain.

[Negin] What I mean is that we line them all up, compare them, and eliminate them. And we leave everyone with 50 or so weapons each for the sole purpose of letting any dictator or terrorist who appears know that weapons of retribution exist. [passage omitted]

[Gubarev] Do you not think that the weapons safety threshold is now being lowered? Particularly in connection with the processes now under way in the former Union?

[Gubarev] Of course, things are at their most tranquil when munitions lie idle. At the storage depot, for

example. When no one touches them or even goes near them. When they are mounted in the warheads of disabled missiles, it is as if they do not exist... But now, at a time of mass shipments, at a time when there is a huge transport accident rate, the degree of safety is naturally falling. But not to the point where you need fear nuclear explosions or the theft of weapons. Military people understand responsibility...

[Gubarev] If a weapon were stolen, could the thieves set it off?

[Negin] It is extraordinarily difficult. Although, as you know, you can do anything with a hammer—out of stupidity, of course. But this would not be a nuclear explosion, but a conventional one. However, the plutonium contained in it is dangerous. It will fragment and partially evaporate and disperse. Plutonium contamination is a catastrophe on a par with Chernobyl... Our designers are now working specifically on ways to make it altogether impossible to detonate a weapon and spread plutonium. It may be a little worse from the military's standpoint, but the main thing is that it is far safer. In general, we are considering not just "idiot-proofing," but "hammer-proofing." I consider it very fortunate that we had Khariton as our scientific leader. Yuliy Borisovich always demanded that we know ten times more than was necessary. And he always paid special attention to safety. Khariton's life, however, is a subject in its own right. He still works now without days off, sometimes until 3 o'clock in the morning, and you know, he is 88 now. True, I can't understand why he lingers now. Previously I would work until 10 at night, then till 7, and nowadays I leave at 5 o'clock, because I see what I can finish it off tomorrow—no one has any need of all this now... [Interview ends]

... It was on that somewhat sad note that my conversation with General and Academician Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin ended.

I listened to the tape of our conversation several times in Moscow. I have endeavored to convey in some measure not just his points, but the inflections too. I have omitted only personal material and a few details—they are of interest only to specialists. I appreciate that there are people who disagree with Negin and who are, moreover, ready to condemn him for having devoted his talent, energy, and life to nuclear weapons. I do not want to argue with them, because it is extremely difficult to prove today that people like Negin guarantee the safety of the planet, the people, and everyone of us. But perhaps there is no need—let history have its say.

#### **Krasnoyarsk Plutonium Production To Cease**

PM2704130692 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
18 Apr 92 Moscow Edition p 1

[Report by Yuriy Rogozhin: "Stopping Reactors in Krasnoyarsk"]

[Text] A collegium session was held at the Russian State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety 17 April. It was attended by specialists from

the Ministry of Atomic Energy, State Counselor A. Yablokov, and people's deputies who are members of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee.

The operation of the two industrial nuclear reactors sited near Krasnoyarsk and designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium was discussed. The academics were particularly concerned about the fact that these reactors are directly cooled by water drawn from and then returned to the Yenisey.

It was noted that, despite the relatively reliable operation of these reactors, the very principle of their operation breaches the recently adopted Law on the Protection of the Environment. On this basis and given the lack of any need to process plutonium, the collegium decided to shut down the first industrial reactor as of 1 June and the second no later than 1 September this year.

#### **Military Doctrine Tenets, Methodology Eyed**

PM2804090192 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 25 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Colonel General V. Miruk, candidate of military sciences and member of the State Commission for the Creation of the Russian Federation's Defense Ministry, Army, and Navy: "Russia's Military Doctrine: What Should It Be Like?"—first two paragraphs are *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* introduction]

[Text] The end of the "cold war" presented the world community with a number of complex questions. What should mutual relations between countries be like? How will this affect the geopolitical disposition of forces? Is the danger of war totally ruled out? These questions cannot but confront the independent states which have emerged in place of the former Union and have already declared their intention to create their own armed forces. And this includes Russia, which has been forced to decide on this step.

What methodological approaches should be used when elaborating the military doctrine and building the armed forces of a sovereign state? V. Miruk, candidate of military sciences and member of the State Commission on the Creation of the Russian Federation's Defense Ministry, Army, and Navy, ponders this issue.

How often do we ponder the meaning of "national security"? The fact is that this is one of the most important conditions of any sovereign state's existence. In a number of countries, and even in the United States which is the example we most often use, the entire system of the functioning of state structures and institutions is geared to guaranteeing national security including in the sphere of politics, the economy, ecology, internal stability, and everyday life [zhiznedeyatelnost].

The political or, more precisely, the juridical foundation for guaranteeing national security is usually the military doctrine. It should define: The state's attitude to war as one of the means of resolving contradictions and defending vitally important interests; sources of potential danger; the essence, aims, nature, and methods of conducting armed struggle; the composition, quantity, and quality of the armed forces and the principles of building them; and much more. And insofar as the military doctrine is a mandatory document for the various state institutions (financial organs, industry, transport, communications, education system, health care, and so on), its basic clauses are approved, as a rule, by the supreme legislative organ. Moreover, the supreme political leadership is granted the right to hone and finalize it.

One of the most important specific features of adopting a military doctrine today resides in the fact that the traditional division of all countries into adversaries, allies, and neutral states has become problematic. Therefore, a modern doctrine cannot perceive any specific state or coalition of states as an adversary. In my view, this is where the main dialectical method for defining and selecting its conceptual clauses can be seen. However, the majority of current affairs writers proceed from a multitude of concepts when drafting the clauses of a military doctrine. Concepts like preventing war, terminating aggression, defense sufficiency, defense strategy, and others, and this complicates its perception.

When dialectically evaluating the internal and external factors and the conceptual clauses of a sovereign state's military doctrine, it is expedient to single out the two fundamental concepts which will define its military-political and military-technical aspects. Concepts like potential danger and potential threat.

It is known that potential danger, as a category, exists quite objectively. This is because

- groupings of the state's armed forces, deployed in peacetime and enjoying high mobilization potential, remain a reality;
- there are territorial disputes between states which, coupled with national-ethnic, economic, religious, and ideological contradictions, could be sources of wars and regional conflicts;
- claims by individual states to a position of dominance on global or regional scales still remain;
- a change of leadership or internal political and economic crises could have a significant effect on an individual state's foreign policy.

Depending on the nature of the development and coincidence of these indicators, the degree of potential danger for a specific state in the current or foreseeable period of time can be defined. But it is the military doctrine which should define ways and measures of neutralizing sources of potential danger. Primarily by

using political, diplomatic, and economic means. As for the armed forces, they should be perceived as the last resort in the entire system of measures for defending the state's sovereignty, to be used only when all others have been fully exhausted and the state is faced with the irreversible emergence of potential threat. In other words, the possibility of aggression, which would require the highest degree of readiness the state and its armed forces to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The two aforementioned concepts define the qualitative state of the armed forces in particular, and of the state as a whole. Naturally, the transition from one status to another requires time to prepare the armed forces, state structures, and the country's mobilization potential. That is, armed forces in peacetime have to be built and maintained on the basis of the concept of potential danger. The armed forces composition "under" the concept of potential threat will differ accordingly. So, in simple terms, the concept of potential danger conditions the rational composition of a state's armed forces. And the concept of potential threat conditions a country's mobilization potential.

What else? The armed forces today must have an acceptable numerical strength of personnel with an acceptable level of expenditure to maintain and equip them, which sensibly accords with the country's economic possibilities. This problem is complex both theoretically and practically. Whereas previously, knowing the probable adversary's identity, military requirements for reliable resistance could be defined by a relatively simple analysis, the absence of such certainty in this sphere calls for new approaches. What are they?

The simplest version offers a method of comparative military-economic analysis of the state and the armed forces of other countries. The basic indicators here are:

- the size of the population and the numerical strength of the armed forces as a percentage ratio of it (in a number of states, this correlation ranges between 0.4 and 0.8 percent);
- GNP (or national income) and the proportion represented by the military budget (in developed countries this ranges between 2.5 and 5.5 percent);
- possibilities for switching the armed forces and the state from a peace-time status to mobilized readiness, in other words the swift attainment of the coefficient of mobilization intensity (on the basis of wartime experience, between 10 and 15 percent of the population would be inducted in the armed forces).

Apart from that, indicators such as the length of the state's borders, the area of its territory, its geostrategic position, the number of officers, generals, and so on, are all used for the purposes of defining the equivalence of states. As a result of such a comparison, it is possible to draw preliminary conclusions on the rational numerical strength of armed forces, proceeding from economic possibilities. Admittedly, these indicators do not reflect

the armed forces' capability to repulse aggression, but merely signify the level of a given country's social development compared to other developed countries, and their influence on the ultimate nature and structure of the armed forces. The requisite (rational) levels for specific branches of the armed forces and armaments can be defined more rigidly using specialist methods.

One of the subsequent stages in formulating proposals on building the armed forces is the elaboration of basic principles for their training and use. In my view, these should include: Forms and methods of military actions, the organization of command and control and comprehensive supply, a system of combat training and demobilization, training of cadres and reserves, normative legal acts. However, whatever rational methods and ways for building the armed forces may be used by the military-political leadership of a sovereign state, it is impossible to guarantee the required effectiveness if they are used autonomously, in isolation. In contemporary conditions—and it is important to take this into account—such a guarantee can be provided only by collective systems of political, economic, and military security. The uniqueness of the situation in which we all find ourselves resides precisely in the unified nature of intelligence systems, automated command and control, and the centralized warning system on the air and space situation for the Russian Federation president and the presidents of other independent states. Therefore, while recognizing each state's right to create its own armed forces, it is necessary to take due account of the actual possibilities for exercising this right. In other words, when dividing up the former unified armed forces, it is impossible to mechanically uproot a security system which took years to build.

And I believe there is one more highly significant aspect. In my view, all these processes must be, figuratively speaking, "covered" by the Air Defense Forces. Or the Air and Space Defense Forces, which they will be in the future. The elements of such a system exist in every state, and, as we know, they guarantee their air and space sovereignty [suverenitet v vozduzhno-kosmicheskem prostranstve]. The elimination and breakdown of the unified multi-echeloned Air Defense Forces will require the creation of such a system in each state, which is neither economically nor technically feasible right now apart from in the Russian Federation, where economic potential and the presence of powerful science and production associations render it possible to create Air and Space Defense Forces on the basis of the Air Defense Forces. Moreover, with the subsequent formation of a unified system of CIS Air and Space Defense, such a solution is prompted by the practice of all developed states, including the United States and Canada. But it requires a political decision—the signing of an agreement on a unified air and space defense system by the heads of state. The urgent need for this, as the saying goes, is staring us in the face—an air and space defense system, like border troops, functions even in peacetime, while all other structures are created for wartime.

To conclude, I want to stress that the prevailing favorable international situation means that there is no hurry for each Commonwealth state to dismantle existing defense systems when creating its own armed forces. Above all, perhaps, in air defense and air and space defense. It provides an opportunity for finding an option for guaranteeing collective security, which would go furthest in satisfying the demands and potential of the individual states and the Commonwealth as a whole.

#### **U.S. May Grant Aid For Scrapping Weapons**

*LD2804101592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0933 GMT 28 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Barsukov]

[Text] Washington April 28 TASS—The Bush Administration has assured the congress that American aid, worth 400 million U.S. dollars, may be given to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in order to scrap nuclear weapons and retrain scientists and specialists now engaged in the production of mass destruction weapons there. The policy of these republics, says a letter addressed to the congress by U.S. First Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on Friday [24 April] evening, meets the terms of such aid, fixed by the congress last December. The contents of this letter were divulged on Monday by the newspaper "WASHINGTON POST".

According to a corresponding congressional decision, the United States will be able to help the former Soviet republics scrap their mass destruction weapons only if the latter assume a commitment to observe the armaments control agreements now in force, allocate substantial means for scrapping the weapons, renounce the now existing military programmes, which go beyond the limits of "legitimate defence requirements", allow the United States to verify the progress of armaments destruction. High-ranking representatives of various government agencies have arrived at the conclusion, after a thorough analysis, that the three republics meet, on the whole, the foregoing preconditions. Eagleburger said the policy and practices of these states were yet at the initial stage of development, and that further U.S. monitoring was required. But they have already assumed satisfactory commitments, which meet the terms of such aid, even if they have not been fulfilled yet, he believes.

There are also nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan. However, this state, according to U.S. officials, has so far failed to comply with the preconditions for U.S. aid to scrap nuclear weapons. The "WASHINGTON POST" says that U.S. officials believe Kazakhstan may expect to get such aid only if it agrees to sign the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty and to become a denuclearised state.

## START TALKS

## General Staff Aide on Preparations for START Implementation

ED2104095192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 20 Apr 92

[Text] The Russian parliament is considering the Soviet-American treaty on reducing strategic armaments signed in 1991 and is getting ready to ratify it. Our correspondent was told at the general staff of the Commonwealth Unified Forces that practical moves have been taken to prepare for the treaty's implementation. And here are more details from the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department Maj. Gen. Viktor Koltunov.

[Begin Koltunov recording in Russian fading to English translation] Russia has rich experience in realizing the treaty on small and medium range missiles. It also has qualified personnel. True, the START treaty is much more complicated but we have already carried out part of the preparatory measures for the treaty's realization. We are preparing to take further steps stipulated by the treaty and there are obstacles in the way since nuclear weapons are deployed in the four former republics of the Soviet Union—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. [end recording]

Ukraine has announced the desire to become a party to the treaty. This may change the text of the treaty and its essence, therefore the United States insists on the bilateral nature of the treaty. At present the republics are searching for a way out of the situation at all levels. Recently a foreign ministers' conference of the four nuclear Commonwealth states was held. Though it has yielded no concrete results Maj. Gen. Viktor Koltunov appears to be optimistic.

[Begin Koltunov recording in Russian fading to English translation] I maintain the participants left the meeting with a determination to finally solve this problem. The sides understand that if the treaty is not ratified no-one gains, neither Russia nor Ukraine, nor Kazakhstan, nor Belarus, nor the international community in general. I hope therefore the sides will find a way out. [end recording]

## Ukraine Stance on START Treaty Criticized

## Russian Foreign Ministry Aide Comments

ED2104153392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1510 GMT 21 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeev]

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament and government must take a political decision to help unblock the current situation around negotiations on ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive

weapons, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a briefing here today.

The treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States last year is bilateral, and Washington, Moscow and some other members of the CIS nuclear four call for the preservation of its character.

The Ukrainian stand is that the number of participants and sides to the treaty must be expanded and the bilateral treaty turned into multi-lateral. This is inadmissible from the Russian point of view, said Yastrzhembskiy, since it will annul all the work done on the elaboration of the 900-page treaty and undermine another document—the 1968 treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

The Russian Foreign Ministry official expressed the hope a political and diplomatic solution to this problem will be found.

## Ukraine Responds to Criticism

OW2204163992 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1601 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry issued an explanation Wednesday [22 April] in connection with a statement made by the director of the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Yastrzhembskiy. At a briefing in Moscow Tuesday [21 April] Yastrzhembskiy said that Ukraine supports increasing the participants in the START treaty between the former USSR and the United States.

The statement of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry says that Ukraine is prepared to comply with the agreement as it applies to its territory and proposed that the four nuclear states of the former USSR support a unified agreement.

In addition the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that Russia's aim to be the only party to the treaty and the only state to oversee its enforcement is unacceptable to Ukraine.

## SDI, DEFENSE &amp; SPACE ARMS

## Space Deals With U.S. Said To Aid SDI

PM2104145692 Moscow KOMSOMOLSK 1414 PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Special correspondents S. Briley and St. Kucher report, plus unattributed postscript: "How We Helped the United States To Economize on the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] Program"]

[Text] Washington and Moscow—Talks on the use in the United States of the Topaz-II nuclear reactor, developed

at the Kurchatov Institute, began a few months ago. The reactor's capacity is insufficient even to light a few apartment blocks, but perfectly sufficient to power a spacecraft on a long interplanetary expedition—to Mars, for instance.

The Americans, incidentally, have been developing a small reactor of their own, though completion of work on this reactor is not envisaged before the next century.

Academician Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy claimed at that time: It is a question only of **participation** by our specialists in the preparations for a flight to Mars: we do not intend to sell the reactor. Two months later it was sold.

These plans were revised only recently. At a news conference in the White House two high-ranking generals from the Pentagon (at the request of the president's assistant press secretary Laura Mehlilo we are unable to give their names) announced that the U.S. Air Force is buying Topaz-II for \$7.5 million—apparently in order to help Russia. Congress and ex-President Ronald Reagan have more than once expressed the wish that the administration support the reforms in the former USSR more actively. The administration has even announced the lifting of the ban on trading in high technologies with the CIS states.

It is said that U.S. experts, traveling round the CIS countries, compiled a list of 3,000 items: Some technologies simply do not exist in the United States, and they are lagging significantly behind in the development of others.

Let us return, however, to Topaz: The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has already requested permission to use the reactor in its program, which was so criticized by Soviet leaders only a few years ago. The Soviet Union usually demanded assurances from foreign partners to whom it sold space or nuclear technology and equipment that they would be used only for peaceful purposes. This is how Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] acted, for example. Time softens principles, and anyway Topaz was sold without its participation.

Across the ocean they are so confident of the complete collapse of our space program that at a session of the House of Representatives it was stated that almost all Soviet space equipment and technology has been offered for sale at knockdown prices. "Knockdown" to such a degree that NASA could buy up not only the orbital space station Mir, but also Energia....

"We do not intend to sell anything at knockdown prices," O. Firsuk, deputy chief of Glavkosmos, assures us. "And there is no question at the moment of selling Mir. And in general there are lots of serious contradictions in our space relations with the Americans."

"The Americans began to develop the world space market in the late sixties. Communications satellites at once became the most expensive commodity, costing up

to \$200 million. Here, it is true, we were unable to compete with the Americans. The cost of producing and launching long-range space probes [sputniki distantsionnogo zondirovaniya] is considerably lower. It is also possible to make money out of materials technology and manned space flights.

"The Soviet Union was becoming a dangerous rival, it seemed. After the Challenger disaster, Shuttle flights and, consequently, the launch of satellites by them, were temporarily halted. The Europeans rushed into the market with their Ariane rocket. Suddenly we appeared on the scene also, with slightly lower prices. But things did not turn out as we expected. It turned out that first of all we had to obtain a license from the Americans for the right to launch satellites on behalf of third countries. The law forbidding the export of space technology and facilities to the now ex-socialist countries continues to operate in the United States. And in virtually any satellite—British or French, Brazilian or Canadian—there is at least one American component, be it ever so small. This means that we do not have the right to launch these satellites without having obtained a license from the U.S. State Department.

"Right now we are competing for the launch of two South Korean communications satellites in which there are also American components. Glavkosmos has twice asked the State Department to issue a license—and both times has received a refusal.

"As a result we have lost about \$3 billion in the last five years alone.

"The Americans are putting pressure on us to abandon certain joint projects involving the transfer of space technology to India, which has no desire to join the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"Yet they themselves the other day offered India military satellites and modern aircraft in exchange for the right for U.S. military ships and submarines to put in at Indian ports...."

#### Incidentally

It is now apparent that we did not sell a working Topaz, but a display model. Having bought this for \$7.5 million, the Pentagon, after carrying out tests on it, expects to obtain economic benefits to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.

#### Krasnoyarsk Radar Station Dismantling Suspended

OW1804223992 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1552 GMT 18 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Krasnoyarsk regional administration Arkadiy Veprev ordered to suspend the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The decision was made

after the administration received reply from the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, [words indistinct] and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in which they pointed to the possibility of suspending the dismantling in the light of new relations between the USA and Russia. In Andrey Kozyrev's view, it would be possible to raise the question of preserving the radar station at the upcoming meeting between the Russian and U.S. presidents.

According to the Krasnoyarsk administration estimates, the remaining part of the radar station (60,000 square meters) can be used as workshops for the production of furniture, thus allowing the region to save 220 million rubles.

If the issue is resolved positively at the upcoming summit, Russia will save about 11 million rubles needed for the full dismantling of the radar station.

### **Krasnoyarsk Wants To Reuse Former Radar Site**

PM2704115492 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
22 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Report by Aleksey Tarasov: "Demolition of Krasnoyarsk Radar Station Buildings Suspended"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk Kray—A. Veprev, head of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Administration, has ordered the suspension of the demolition of the buildings of the former Krasnoyarsk Radar Station.

Army subunits began demolishing the radar station in 1989 at the decision of the USSR leadership with a view to fulfilling the 1972 ABM Treaty. The U.S. Administration insisted on the destruction of the Krasnoyarsk Station at a time when it was still impossible to imagine that the communist regime would fall so rapidly. Otherwise it is possible that agreement might have been reached with the U.S. side not to destroy this strategic installation deep in Siberia so barbarically, completely demolishing it.

Today three- and five-story ruins are all that remains of the massive structure. Its equipment and apparatus have been wholly dismantled. Essentially, this missile early-warning installation no longer exists.

The inhabitants of the formerly secret Yeniseysk-15 and nearby settlements not only asked the Russian president for a halt to the destruction of the lower levels of the radar station buildings—which could be used for economic purposes—they also wrote to George Bush.

The request submitted to the Russian president by A. Veprev helped. It states that the issue could be discussed as a preliminary measure at the forthcoming meeting of Russian and U.S. foreign ministers. The Krasnoyarsk Kray leadership's assessment is that the abandonment of the further demolition of the station buildings would make it possible to save around 200 million rubles' worth of capital investment for the national economy.

Only if the U.S. Administration agrees to the handover of the impressive ruins for civil purposes. Will we profit from these millions? It seems that what has been saved from "disarmament" may simply be looted. The radar station buildings have now moved from one monopoly (the Defense Ministry) into the hands of another—the "Sibirenergo" TEO [fuel and energy association] Joint-Stock Company. The energy workers have plans to site a furniture factory and a joint silk production venture with the Chinese here. But so far this has not been allowed and the former military installation is being used in the traditional way in the national economy—today in Yeniseysk-15 you can exchange any construction material for a bottle of vodka. In summer, when the roads allow, everything of value will be finally taken away.

I recently talked with the leaders of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Union of Entrepreneurs. They believe that the former radar station and the settlement attached to it constitute an area where new life could begin for the entire Yeniseyskiy Rayon. All the conditions for this are in place—good water supply, good communications, and buildings suitable for industrial production. There is something else to attract people too—empty housing, a kindergarten, and schools. The Yenisey is alongside. According to the specialists the microclimate is beneficial.

### **Debate on Russian GPALS Role Viewed**

PM2804120192 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 28 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by G. Khromov: "From SDI via GPALS to Common Defense System"]

[Text] The U.S. ABM system—the so-called "strategic defense initiative" (SDI)—conceived in the early eighties under President R. Reagan and at that time blatantly directed against the USSR and at undermining strategic stability, under the conditions of the altered military-political situation in the world can no longer lay claim to a place in the sun. That now seems obvious to everyone. The idea of global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes (GPALS) advanced last year was a life saver for the former program. Under cover of arguments about the need to prevent an accidental nuclear war, it enables the Pentagon to keep afloat several of the former SDI developments.

The Western mass media, especially the U.S. media, are bristling with reports about the continuing struggle for various versions of an ABM system. Congressmen, military specialists, and scientific experts are either justifying or criticizing them. Sometimes diametrically opposed opinions are being voiced. But as a whole U.S. Congress supports SDI's transformation into the GPALS program, although the congressmen's enthusiasm in this respect has recently diminished somewhat. A part has

also been played by the reports distributed by the Congress service of the minimal cost of the new program—\$68.5 billion (the Pentagon asserted quite recently that expenditure on it would not exceed \$48 billion). And that is in addition to the \$20 billion already spent.

The transition from SDI to GPALS leads to a change in priorities in the development and deployment of ABM defense means. The priority task has already been formulated and approved by Congress and provides as the basis for building GPALS the deployment of ground-based interceptor-missiles with the unconditional (for the next few years at any rate) observance of the Soviet-U.S. 1972 ABM Treaty. In accordance with the treaty it is planned over the course of four years to deploy one ABM complex (up to 100 antiballistic missiles) at the Grand Forks base (North Dakota). Work in the field of an ABM space echelon—the basis of the former SDI—is so far to be restricted to research only.

At the same time reports are appearing that some people in the Pentagon do not like this way of posing the question. Under the conditions of the financial restrictions imposed by Congress, proposals are being made whereby the sheep should remain unharmed and the wolves sated. In particular an idea has emerged for deploying at Grand Forks not 100 but just four antiballistic missiles and one radar station and channelling the funds thus saved into the development of new antiballistic missiles and observation systems which would subsequently serve as the basis for inclusion in the future GPALS. The base in Grand Forks would become a unique testing ground for troop tests of this system.

At the same time the organization for the implementation of SDI does not want totally to abandon space weapons for the notorious "star wars." In the situation which is taking shape they suggested using several types of space technologies developed in the former USSR. And using them virtually free of charge (since Congress is not allocating sufficient funds for these technologies). Especially as our suggestion regarding the joint development of a common defensive system for protection against ballistic missiles.

Recently the authoritative U.S. magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY lifted the curtain over how the United States intends to use this initiative of ours. It is planned to recruit to work in the United States up to 1,000 Russian specialists, paying them a salary of about \$460 a month (far less than that paid to U.S. specialists) and to acquire several very important technologies in technical fields where the Americans objectively lag behind us. That includes in particular liquid-propellant missile engine technology (here, as the Americans themselves admit, they have a lag of 10-15 years, if not more), electric propellers, "Topaz-2" space nuclear installations and others.

And our entire contribution to the joint defense system is assessed by the Americans at \$50 million!

Yet relatively recently U.S. aerospace firms were prepared, for instance, outside the programs for "joint" defense systems, to conclude a contract with us for several hundred million dollars for just one of the technologies under examination—a missile engine based on liquid oxygen and kerosene. At the time political obstacles prevented the signing of this contract. Now it is another matter. After all, everything necessary to make up their lag in several fields of technology and to implement their plans to achieve overwhelming superiority in space under the flag of creating the joint GPALS system can be obtained virtually for a few pennies. The Americans, as a report by the research center of the ruling Republican party, the "Heritage Foundation," says, have no intention of handing their leading technologies over to Russia.

And the extent to which this proposed joint system will consider the interests of both countries was made clear by U.S. First Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger. The press attests that he has his priorities precisely and clearly sorted out: The aim of nondetriment to U.S. national security should come first (and what will happen to the security of the United States' partner in the joint development is unimportant), second—the consequences for producers in the United States should be only positive, that is, in other words, the other partner in the joint work can be fleeced as you choose. The only important thing is that the interests of U.S. businessmen should not suffer.

There is not even talk of anything else.

That is how matters stand with regard to the SDI-GPALS program for "joint" defense today.

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### Ukraine Threatens Flights to U.S. Missile Base

LD2204174992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1524 GMT 22 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—The flights of Russian inspectors to a missile factory in the United States, which are linked to the fulfillment of the treaty on medium and long-range missiles, are under threat of disruption.

Il-62M aircraft from a military unit stationed in Nikolayev (southern Ukraine) have been serving these routes. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed from reliable sources that as of 1 April, the Ukrainian side has imposed a ban on their operations and has demanded payment based on Aeroflot's commercial route rates.

The amount concerned is several thousand dollars and millions of rubles for one flight to San Francisco. The organizations carrying out the inspections do not have such sums, and there are simply no other aircraft, or, in

particular, crews trained and permitted by the American side to fly these routes either in Russia or in other states of the CIS.

In accordance with the medium and long-range missile treaty, both the United States and Russia must fulfill their control obligations over a period of a number of years.

A military aircraft was due to fly [18 April] from Nikolayev to San Francisco, but the flight did not take place. Meanwhile, the American inspectors are continuing their mission.

### Charges of Arms Treaty Noncompliance Examined

*MK2904180092 Moscow KURANTY in Russian  
29 Apr 92 p 3*

[Mikhail Shchipanov article under "Our Commentary" rubric: "For the Sins of the Union"]

[Text] Indeed, the sins of the defunct Union are increasingly hounding Russia, which is the legal successor of the collapsed state. On this occasion the "new" Kremlin is being unobtrusively accused of the juggling and maneuvering of the already fading Gorbachev epoch. A joke's a joke, but a group of six senators—of a conservative persuasion, one must assume—has sent President Bush a wagonload of compromising material against Moscow. "The American six" asserts, in particular, that the Union authorities did not completely destroy their stock of SS-20 and SS-23 medium-range missiles. Quite the reverse, they concealed some of the medium-range missiles, and having concealed them they put a few missiles aside "for a rainy day."

Accusations that are both serious and political, so to speak. Particularly now, when the pans of the scales on which people constantly want to measure the assistance we need will in no way finally come to rest. And, indeed, the sins are of the Union Communist type, but certain secret missiles—if the senators are to be believed—remain concealed on the territory of democratic Russia. Well I do declare—a fine argument in the hand of the isolationists, who acquire particular force in the leap years of the presidential elections. Whom do you wish to help, they say, wresting a spare dollar from the unfortunates in America itself? How much to feed the Soviets...

And then precisely following suit came a completely official document released from the bowels of the White House. The report, which, it is maintained, President Reagan had stored in his own office since December, is also replete with accusations leveled at the "departed" Union in the area of compliance with disarmament treaties. Here we have both the transfer of SS-23 missiles to former East European allies, and noncompliance with articles of the ABM Treaty—which, by the way, the Americans are not thinking how to discard.

However, the official charges are all as well known as a matching set, are not indisputable, and are somewhat the worse for age. But something else is surprising. Just how does a report prepared while Gorbachev was still in power come into the public domain only now? If it is all a matter of tactics on Bush's part, then it turns out that the President prefers "to cut the tail into little pieces" ("rezat khvost po kuskam"), which hardly represents the best policy in the modern world. It is more likely that the report was needed now precisely in order to demonstrate the vigilance worthy of a president. That is, no senators are capable of caring more about national security than the head of the White House himself. In principle the ritual of the campaign battle demands a show of definite toughness and persistence. Only anything the President says can be directed against his efforts "to fill in the Bering Strait." Russian-American trust is a fragile thing.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

### Lithuania Plans Referendum To Force Prompt CIS Withdrawal

**Landsbergis Seeks Withdrawal 'This Year'**  
*LD1604111392*

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 11 April broadcasts a 5-minute report by Algirdas Ušas from a meeting of the chairmen of town and rayon councils and of heads of council secretariats to discuss the referendum on restoring the institution of president. During the meeting a speech was made by Vytautas Landsbergis in which he says:

"I wanted to call your attention to something which, to my way of thinking, is a basic question and also a basic aspect. I mentioned that we shall probably have several expressions of opinion by the people about their [words indistinct] (?styles). It has already been proposed to speak out, also by means of a referendum—and perhaps on that same day [as presidential referendum], if that turns out to be technically convenient, concerning the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army during this year.

"There are those who do not understand, or perhaps intentionally fail to understand. They have already begun to ask how much it is possible to demand, to withdraw [word indistinct]. Everyone is aware that signatures (?have been collected) etc. Thus, I say: Withdraw them altogether. That is, not only withdraw, but withdraw this year.

"I was told one time that somehow that statement was formulated sharply—just as it appeared in the foreign press [word indistinct]. When I was asked what my time terms were, when do I demand to have the Soviet Army withdrawn, well I told them: Before the second putsch takes place. Since anything can happen there we cannot wait to see whether it will or not, and how things will progress there.

"This is a question which concerns our security, our independence, the life we are trying to create, and finally that of our families' and our children's destiny. This is why this proposal by the Christian Democrats' Party has already been placed before the Supreme Council, to include in the referendum for withdrawal this year, which again would provide a similar political basis as when in '88 we collected signatures and when we collected signatures in '89. That is not a delegation's opinion that it is possible to press for (guarantees), it is not Landsbergis' opinion, it is (not) possible to expect either to soften or, in the worst case, to [words indistinct]. All of the people have stated—all the people—that no delegation has the right to negotiate regarding [words indistinct] for the army's withdrawal this year!"

"Thus it seems to me that withdrawal this year is a prospect—the question has been raised. Of course, the Supreme Council must vote on this itself, so that the Christian Democrats or Sajudis will not have to collect signatures and incite thousands in order to conduct a referendum. The Supreme Council can adopt a decision on that in two days, and prepare a referendum. I think that will take place."

The report concludes with Landsbergis' comments on the Constitution.

#### Parliament Debates Question

OW1704083392 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
0746 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the halls of the Lithuanian parliament deputies are actively discussing the possibility of including the question "Do you agree that in 1992 the army of the former USSR should be completely withdrawn from Lithuania?" in the May 24th referendum on introducing the post of president to the Lithuanian government.

This idea was voiced two weeks ago by the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party of Lithuania. A faction of the party began gathering signatures of the Lithuanian deputies. A deputy of the faction Vytautas Puplauskas said that by April 15 69 signatures had been collected. If signatures of half the deputies (that is, 70) are gathered the question of the withdrawal of forces will be included in the referendum. The deputies feel that a positive answer to this question will expedite the process of talks with Russia on the withdrawal of forces, and will facilitate more decisive support for the Baltic countries from the West.

Confidential sources told "BALTFAX" that the faction of the Christian Democratic Party prepared a version of the question "Do you support the demand that in 1992 the army of the former USSR be fully withdrawn from Lithuania, that damages incurred during the republic's annexation by the former USSR be compensated?" Several deputies support the new version.

Factions of leftists and centrists in the Lithuanian parliament are opposed to the inclusion of this question. The leader of the centrist faction, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania Aloyzas Sakalas said that 1.5 million signatures of Lithuanian citizens gathered in 1989 on the question of the withdrawal of forces "is more than a weighty argument, therefore there is no need to include the question in the impending referendum".

#### Landsbergis Urges Referendum

LD2204181792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1310 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Vytas Usas report from "the Parliament Radio studio"]

[Excerpts] A draft decision of the Supreme Council on holding a referendum for citizens to express their will on the unconditional and undelayed withdrawal of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in 1992, and paying compensation for the damage caused to Lithuania was presented to the Supreme Council at yesterday's plenary session. The draft was presented by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council. At the request of the United Sajudis Faction of the Supreme Council, here is a recording of part of the plenary session:

[Begin Landsbergis recording] Esteemed colleagues, Ceslovas Stankevicius—although you did not listen to what he was saying very attentively—was trying to present an exhaustive elucidation on the existing situation not only concerning our negotiations on the withdrawal of the troops, but he also regarded the situation from the angle of our relations with the Russian State in general, the state where various political forces are in existence. What is that angle? You must have heard phrases being quoted about Lithuania as the sphere of Russia's interests; we have been hearing such concepts as the common space for more than a year, which has been proposed to us and is still being proposed in various forms, including the common defense. We can see that until now our state borders are being interpreted either as a common border or as a CIS border, at least partially, because the former Soviet border troops refuse to withdraw from these borders, giving the reason that the other border further down in the east has not yet been installed and in this way a situation is enforced on us with the help of the troops' presence.

Time is being drawn out at the negotiations; as Ceslovas Stankevicius said, the negotiations are practically not taking place. The same situation applies in Estonia. I talked recently to Chairman Ruutel; the delegations had met once again, and again a deadlock was reached. The position of the Estonian delegation and of the head of the delegation is that the troops should be withdrawn this year. No common language has been found, and the withdrawal schedule is not being set up. Why is time being drawn out? We know that the pretext given is apartments and barracks, although the number of troops

has to be reduced and therefore the issue of barracks is absolutely not essential. The issue of apartments for officers could be resolved if there was good will. [passage omitted]

What we can do and what would be really firm is not some questionnaires or statements by the deputies, but a demand which would be at the level of the supreme Lithuanian law, and which would not depend either on the government, parliament, or the stand of the chairman of the Supreme Council. [passage omitted] If such a demand were to be adopted by way of a referendum, there would be no temptation for the force hostile to us to wait for some more flexible Supreme Council, or a more favorable distribution of political forces, or a more realistic chairman of the Supreme Council. By the way, your refusal to strengthen the stand of the chairman—and this is your right—may undoubtedly strengthen hopes that there might be another more flexible chairman on the withdrawal of the Army, too.

Having adopted such an irrevocable decision in a referendum, we would really show that hopes should not be pinned on some additional changes in the Supreme Council, or changes in the government, or that may be economic pressure and the worsening of Lithuania's economic situation would not then be justified in order that the desired changes take place. Because these changes would not change the results of the referendum. [passage omitted]

I must remind you that the date for the referendum should not be later than June, because we are approaching a decisive decision in Helsinki—the summit meeting and the signing or not of the final act. May be it is possible to agree on the date for May or the beginning of June.

Thank you for your attention. [end recording]

#### Experts' Delegations Meet

LD2304174292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1055 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] The third meeting of expert groups of the Lithuanian and Russian negotiating delegations on the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania started in Vilnius today. The Lithuanian group of experts is headed by Minister Aleksandras Abisala and the Russian group by Viktor Isakov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Russia.

The meeting of the two expert groups is expected to continue for two days.

[Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1250 GMT broadcasts a relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session, during which Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council says the following.

"Esteemed deputies, just one sentence. The Russian side has officially declared at the third session of the Lithuanian and Russian expert groups, which started today that it is not prepared to set forth its position on or to discuss the date of its troops' withdrawal from Lithuania. Thank you."]

#### No Progress Reported

OH 2404211592 Moscow BILTEAX in English  
1915 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Lithuanian experts' delegation at talks with Russia on the withdrawal of troops, Minister Aleksandras Abisala stated that currently it is impossible to continue work on technical aspects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. Speaking to reporters Friday [24 April] after the third meeting with Russian colleagues in Vilnius, he said that first of all the Russian and Lithuanian delegations should "find solutions to political questions"

Abisala said that the Lithuanian side puts its hopes on the visit of Boris Yeltsin's special envoy, first deputy minister of foreign affairs Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev to Vilnius April 27.

According to Abisala, at the third meeting the Russian side raised new "unexpected and unacceptable to Lithuania questions", such as compensation for the property left by the Russian army in Lithuania.

Head of the Russian group of experts, ambassador Viktor Isakov told reporters after the meeting that Russia would not like to set terms for the withdrawal hastily, and then to violate them.

Speaking on Lithuanian TV, Abisala pointed out that the Lithuanian side considers terms of the withdrawal to be the main issue at the talks. "Therefore, if Russian representatives have no even mandates to discuss terms, it's rather hard to talk about other details", the minister noted. He said that the two sides had also failed to start discussing compensation for the losses inflicted to Lithuania by Soviet troops.

#### Landsbergis Calls for Immediate Removal

LD2504112192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 25 Apr 92

On 24 April, Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Landsbergis held a telephone conversation with Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Russian Northwestern army group, who phoned him. The topic of the conversation was new military groups brought by Russian military planes to Lithuania and the control of the Russian military land transport carried by the Lithuanian Defense Ministry. Vytautas Landsbergis reminded Mironov that the transportation of Russian soldiers by planes to Kazlu-Ruda near Kaunas is a complete disregard of the sovereignty and laws of the

Republic of Lithuania and stated that the Republic of Lithuania will not allow the dispersal of these several hundred soldiers on the country's territory. On the contrary, it demands that they immediately are removed the same way and Vilnius is informed about the elimination of the incident.

#### Funds Sought To Speed Withdrawal

OW 2704214192 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1806 GMT 27 Apr 92

[From the "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis made a TV appearance Sunday [26 April] on the pullout of foreign troops from Lithuania.

Supreme Soviet chairman was skeptical on the results of negotiations with Russia without a clear-cut timetable for the withdrawal. According to him, it is expedient to use the good political moment, the July upcoming Helsinki meeting, and not only to declare Lithuania's demands but also to receive Russia's concrete answer to the request.

Landsbergis does not see a cloudless political future for the Russian leadership. He emphasized: "Our relations with President Yeltsin are good. We wish well to Russian democracy. However, we would be irresponsible leaders if we did not prepare ourselves for the worst-case scenario."

Lithuania, said he, planned to request international agencies and western states to create a special migration fund. This structure would help the families of the banished people (who were purged during the Soviet power) to return and make home in Lithuania, and the families of Russian officers to return to Russia. Landsbergis believes that the resolution of the housing problem for the servicemen leaving Lithuania could provide an impulse to immediate withdrawal of the troops. The head of government allows the possibility of giving hard currency to help the military relocate.

The results of a national referendum on the destiny of foreign troops in Lithuania could, Landsbergis says, become an important political weapon and "help democratic Russia in its fight against conservatives."

#### Referendum Set for 14 Jun

OW 2704213792 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1838 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At an emergency meeting Monday [27 April] the Lithuanian parliament voted to hold a June 14, 1992, referendum on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the republic in 1992 (58 deputies voted for the decision).

52 deputies voted to include this question in the May 23 referendum on the introduction of presidency in Lithuania additionally. However, the parliament rejected the proposal.

#### Polish Concerns Over Kaliningrad Army Rebuffed

PM2404085092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
21 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Sergey Guk and Leonid Kornilov: "Feelings Running High Over the 'Kalininograd Enclave.' There Are Those Who Are Impatient To Turn it Into a New Military Threat Hotbed"]

[Text] Recently Warsaw has been getting "asthmatic" over Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast. Politicians, the military, and the media are in a state of nervous tension. The gist of the grievances is that Poland faces a new military threat from there.

Some 250,000-300,000 CIS servicemen are stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast, the worried voices say, and their numbers are continuing to be swelled by military units that are being withdrawn from the FRG, Poland, and the Baltic states—splendidly trained units with modern equipment. Moscow's explanation for all this is that there is a shortage of housing in the interior of Russia. But here too both soldiers and officers and their families are having to live in tents...

According to the paper POLSKA ZBROJNA, which specializes in the military threat from the East, a dangerous situation has developed: "Former Soviet experts know everything about the Polish military machine, whereas all our specialists know about them is what Moscow permitted them to know." Border protection has deteriorated, the paper continues, and the situation in the "enclave" is explosive. It is overpopulated already, "but heavily armed units are continuing to arrive with their families and belongings. Who knows what to expect from these deceived and disappointed people?"

Polish National Defense Minister J. Parys addressed the matter on 20 March, voicing serious concern "in connection with the major concentration of forces of the former USSR in Kaliningrad Oblast." The minister said that he saw no reason why such a massive number of troops of a foreign state had to be stationed so close to Poland's borders. J. Parys called for the establishment of a 50-km zone with a reduced troop presence on both sides of the border and the holding of talks in this connection. And although the minister has gone on "leave," more like retirement, since then, his statement has not been officially disavowed.

The POLSKA ZBROJNA editorial office may not know all the details of what is happening. But the Polish Defense Ministry must have full information. So it knows full well that the numerical strength of the "Kalininograd grouping" has remained virtually unchanged in recent years. Here is the official information supplied by

Lieutenant General Viktor Barynkin, first deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff main directorate: "They can only be talking about troops in transit, and there is no way this can increase the number of troops permanently stationed there. So there can be no question of any 'over-militarization' of Kaliningrad Oblast. There is even the possibility that the number of troops here might be cut."

The general has a personal stake, I hear you say. Fine, in that case, there is the evidence of impartial people. In accordance with the treaty on conventional armaments in Europe, the "Kalininograd grouping" is being continuously monitored at an international level. The foreign military specialists involved in this have no complaints to make: There are no grounds for any.

### Grachev on Russian Troop Pullout From Poland

PM2304143092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 21 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "\$300 Million To Provide Facilities for Servicemen Being Withdrawn From Poland"—first three paragraphs and last paragraph are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction and conclusion]

[Text] The latest round of the Russian-Polish talks on problems of the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces did not give rise to optimism. Diplomats and specialists have been marking time for more than a year. This time the impasse became apparent on the very first day of the meeting. Only it was still more rigidly delineated. It was overcome on the second day largely thanks to the decisive and unbending stand taken by the head of our delegation at the talks—Colonel General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister.

For the first time in the entire history of the talks our delegation was headed not by a Foreign Ministry representative but by a high-ranking military leader with excellent knowledge of what must be sought in order to ensure acceptable living conditions in the new places where the troops being withdrawn are to be stationed. In addition, the country's president has personally vested him with powers to adopt responsible decisions.

It is possible to gain a fuller picture of the results of the talks in Warsaw from the interview which Col. Gen. P. Grachev granted to our correspondent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is your assessment of the latest round of Russian-Polish talks on the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces? Was a solution found to the chief problem of settling the property and financial accounts connected with the troops' presence and withdrawal?

[Grachev] In my view, the deadlock over the basic question—the financial and property question—was finally overcome. True, the discussion was very difficult: All the time the Polish side was trying to force us to agree to the "zero" option—not to take account of the damage we have done to ecology nor, at the same time, to count the cost of the installations we are leaving behind. This is the first point. The second, most important point is that on the second day and even in the final hour the working documents which had been drawn up were agreed upon. Both we and the Poles will show them to our leaders: to Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and the Polish diplomats to their president and government. The working document consists of seven points. I believe that with its help it is possible to resolve the financial and property question in all fairness. I believe that we will initial this document in time for Mr. Walesa's visit to Moscow and that Walesa and Yeltsin will sign this document during the Russian-Polish summit meeting itself.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Our countries' businessmen very frequently complain that the installations left behind by the Northern Group of Forces units that are withdrawn frequently are not utilized and fall into disrepair at a time when they could be of mutual benefit. Are any prospects being opened up for businessmen from Poland, Russia, and other countries to make joint use of the installations being freed?

[Grachev] The Polish leadership does not permit private entrepreneurs to conclude contracts directly with us to set up joint ventures based on our real estate, although there are very many who would like to do so on both the Polish and the Russian side. There are plenty of businessmen from other countries who would like to do so, too. But Polish law makes no provision for such a possibility, and such a deal can only be concluded through the Polish Government. One of the points in our working document contains a provision which allows the creation of joint ventures at certain installations—and there are quite a lot of them—with the profit from their future economic activity going to provide facilities for our troops being withdrawn to Russia.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The Northern Group of Forces possesses considerable stocks of material assets. It is not advantageous to take all of them home because of the transport costs. Was a compromise found in respect of movable property? Will the Northern Group of Forces be permitted to sell it on the spot to interested Polish and foreign firms?

[Grachev] Movable property is sold according to the plan of the commander of the Northern Group of Forces. In our plans we provide for the removal to Russia of a considerable proportion of the movable property, but we have also proposed an option under which, if the Polish side shows interest, a large part of the property could be sold to them. The Poles are considering this question, and I believe that they will be interested in buying a large part of the movable property.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But, again, for this it is necessary to obtain the Polish side's permission. For there is still a ban on Polish entrepreneurs buying anything from us, and all deals of this kind have unilaterally been declared "illegal" with all the ensuing consequences of a repressive kind for firms...

[Grachev] I believe that the Poles are more interested in trade.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could you tell me the approximate total value of the real estate we are leaving behind in Poland—various installations constructed with the funds of the Defense Ministry of the former USSR? Was a compromise found with the Polish side in the matter of selling it?

[Grachev] Unfortunately, no. We have calculated with our experts that our real estate being left behind in Poland is valued, according to the most modest estimates, at something of the order of \$400 million. But the Poles reckon that we are not being objective. Their amounts have plainly been understated, but they have not given us their figures. We have offered to let Poland have 25 percent of this \$400 million, i.e. \$100 million, as compensation for the ecological harm caused by us. We intend to use the remaining \$300 million to provide facilities for the troops being withdrawn to Russia.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Something like 7,500 of the Northern Group of Forces servicemen being withdrawn do not have apartments to go to. Will these and other funds derived from the economic activities of joint ventures and the sale of movable property be used primarily to provide facilities for the troops in their new places of stationing?

[Grachev] Not just primarily but, on the whole, precisely for this. We do not need "extra money" from the Polish side to build any other installations, except for the construction of housing for 7,500 Northern Group of Forces servicemen without apartments so that we can use this money either to build apartments or to buy them. This is the only thing we need. We demand nothing else of the Polish side. Particularly as we need approximately \$300 million for the construction of apartments—then we will be able to provide servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces with housing. [interview ends]

So, the position of the Russian Defense Ministry with regard to the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces has been revealed with the utmost clarity. It only remains to hope that it will assume finished form in the documents which are finally agreed on and signed. We do not believe that reaching a compromise connected with transactions concerning the troops' presence and withdrawal accords with the interests of Russia alone. It accords no less with the interests of Poland and its people. Because we have to continue living next to each other. But to live and not be friends nor trade on mutually advantageous terms—who needs this or benefits from it?

### **Further on Estonian Quest for Russian Troop Withdrawal**

#### **Sweden Backs Estonian Demand**

*LD2604183592 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 22 Apr 92*

[Text] Sweden supports the Estonian demand for the ex-USSR troop withdrawal as soon as possible. This was stated by Margaretha af Ugglas, Swedish foreign minister, at a news conference.

According to ETA, the Swedish foreign minister—currently in Estonia on the occasion of the visit of King Carl XVI Gustaf—had talks with Jaan Manitski, Estonian foreign minister, today. Matters related to the withdrawal of what are now Russian troops were indeed the main subject at the news conference organized for both Estonian and foreign journalists. [Break in transmission] The Swedish foreign minister emphasized that the security of the Baltic basin area is a common interest to all the states located in it. Speaking of specific Swedish support to Estonia, Manitski emphasized that even though material assistance must be viewed as important in every way, political support to the Republic of Estonia will be in the future (?definitely) more important.

#### **Experts' Talks Continue**

*LD2804162592 Tallinn Estonian Radio in English 1520 GMT 28 Apr 92*

[Text] The expert groups on the military questions of the Estonian-Russian negotiations met in Tallinn today. The talks take place in the framework of the Estonian-Russian negotiations and will continue tomorrow.

The main subject of the talks is the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia. Estonia has submitted a draft agreement on troops' withdrawal which includes the deadlines and order of the troops' pull-out. Russia has presented its draft agreement at the plenary meeting of the two delegations; however, the draft lacked any concrete deadlines. According to the Estonian deputy minister of defense, Mr. Toomas Puura, it was rather a draft agreement on troops staying in Estonia. Experts for the Russian part are led by the first deputy commander in chief of Naval Forces, Admiral Fedor Gromov, and the Estonian group is led by the Estonian deputy minister of defense, Toomas Puura.

### **New Belarusian Defense Minister Views Military Policy**

#### **Planned Troop Levels, Force Structure**

*LD2604224192 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Apr 92*

[Report by Belarusian Radio correspondent Anatoly Ovcherenko on 23 April session of Belarusian Supreme Soviet in Minsk, including "small excerpt" of speech by Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, new Belarusian

defense minister, at Supreme Soviet session; from the "New Wave" program presented by Kim Kukholev—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kukholev] The session of the Byelarusian Supreme Soviet continued its work in Minsk today. Of course, the interest and attention which it is receiving from the public is heightened, for the Supreme Soviet is considering a whole series of matters of vital importance to the republic, including, as far as I am aware, the military issue. I am now speaking to my colleague from Belarussian Radio, Anatoliy Ovcherenko, who ought now to be in contact with us. Can you hear us?

[Ovcherenko] Yes, Kim, I can hear you clearly. Good evening. [passage omitted] A minister of defense has been appointed in the Republic of Byelarus. He is Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, age 50. [passage omitted]

The chairman of the Council of Ministers, who presented the minister of defense at the session, explained that he chose this candidate because he is an experienced high-class specialist, and a capable leader, who thinks deeply about his decisions. At the same time, he listens to the opinions of others. This is how the minister of defense was described, but naturally before they made their choice, the people's deputies were interested in what the candidate's views on the sovereign state's military policy are. Of course, the general spoke at the session for about 20 minutes. I shall now give "New Wave" listeners just a small excerpt from his speech to the Supreme Soviet session:

[Kozlovskiy] The nucleus of the republic's armed forces must be a high-class professional. It is thought that the creation of a grouping of ground forces with a total strength of around 40,000 best meets the military-political conditions which are developing, and our own economic capabilities. The troops of the [Byelarusian Military] District are being taken as the basis of the establishment of a grouping of ground forces. But the existing old structures, with powerful tanks and components, are no longer appropriate for dynamic military operations and local conflicts. Therefore, an important role in the structure of our armed forces will be taken by combat-ready units, including assault landing units, capable of operating in any direction from which a threat to the republic's security emanates.

For the Air Force, it is considered possible to have a multi-purpose aviation group capable of carrying out the basic tasks of covering the most important installations, providing air support for the troops, and transferring troops and cargoes by air.

As for the Air Defense Forces, there is no doubt that they must comprise a unified system providing reliable cover for the airspace of the sovereign Republic of Belarus and its important administrative, political, and industrial

centers and [word indistinct]. The total strength of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces might be around 30-32,000 men.

Overall, it is planned that the republic's armed forces will be 40 percent smaller—I stress, smaller—than the existing group. They will number about 90,000 men, including up to 22,000 officers. It is intended to treat the strategic forces on the republic's territory as a separate group of troops totalling 35,000 to 40,000 men. We are compelled to agree to their presence on our territory and to undertake certain obligations. They are set out in the agreements on the status of the strategic forces.

A separate section, the strategic position of Byelarus, must be subjected to deep analysis. Most important international communications run through and over Byelarus, and we must assume that the European Community is interested in the maintenance of stability in our region. So far, this factor has not been borne in mind and exploited sufficiently; this also applies to the way that we tackle our defense tasks. While avoiding the slightest trace of nuclear blackmail, diktat, or ultimatums in its dialogue with the West, Byelarus is entitled to expect compensation for its voluntary renunciation of the status of a nuclear state. In return for guarantees of military-strategic stability, the West can offer much, and we must not be afraid of a sensible, civilized, political deal. We must be bolder in our dialogue on military matters with our immediate neighbors. There must be no vacuum here.

[Ovcherenko] I would like to add to this speech by the minister of defense that the upkeep—just the upkeep—of these 90,000-strong Byelarusian armed forces will cost 12 billion rubles; and if you add purchases of equipment and weaponry and everything else, it will probably reach 17 billion rubles. This is what was said at the session. Of course, this is a very great test, a very great burden, for the republic's budget. Various ways of avoiding this high expenditure were proposed. We should probably not talk about them now.

However, to supplement this topic about which I am now telling listeners to "New Wave", I should like to say that the third meeting of military experts from the Republic of Byelarus and the Russian Federation ended in Minsk yesterday. The sides have at last agreed on which units, hardware, and weapons will stay within the republic's armed forces, and which will go to the strategic forces of the CIS.

[Kukholev] What is going to stay? That is what I would like to know.

[Ovcherenko] I was unable to find out any details from the experts. The specialists told me that the carveup was very difficult, but common sense and trust prevailed, all the same. [passage omitted]

**Comments Further**

018 290412Z 92 Moscow Central Television  
First Program and Orluba Networks in Russian  
1800 GMT 27 Apr 92

[A. Zhuk interview from Byelarus; from the "Utro" program]

[Text] [Zhuk] When the republic's minister of defense was nominated at the parliament session, a singular situation was created. Up until now, one general carried out the minister's duties while another commanded the Byelarus Military District.

However, the premier proposed the chief of staff, First Deputy District Commander Pavel Kozlovskiy, as the new defense minister. As has been mentioned in the presentation, this 50-year-old lieutenant general understands both the officers and the soldiers. He is a professional military man, an ethnic Byelarus who has a clear concept of the republic's military doctrine.

[Begin recording] [Zhuk] Pavel Pavlovich, journalists have called you the dashing general."

[Kozlovskiy] And you do not understand why? I think that this is a good beginning.

[Zhuk] Maybe the reason is the impressive number of votes that you received.

[Kozlovskiy] I am happy about the many votes, but not so much because they support me. I have the feeling that it is the republic's armed forces who are supported, and this is what makes me especially happy.

[Zhuk] What kind of army will our defense minister be commanding?

[Kozlovskiy] The Army of the Byelarus Republic.

[Zhuk] Of course. But actually I wanted to ask about the size, the equipment, and so on.

[Kozlovskiy] As I have already mentioned yesterday, the financial possibilities of the republic allow the republic to have an army capable of defending it—about 90,000 or 95,000 servicemen. Such an army might have about 22,000 officers. Undoubtedly, it will have to undergo reform so as to become more maneuverable and mobile, capable of defending the republic's interests and sovereignty. The main idea that goes into forming the army, into the structures that are yet to be created, is included in the declaration of independence. It is the idea of sovereignty and of a neutral, non-nuclear state. All the structures are being developed on the basis of this main idea.

[Zhuk] Speaking of a non-nuclear state, how soon will Byelarus get rid of this terrible weapon?

[Kozlovskiy] The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the republic's territory is already near completion. The strategic nuclear weapons, according to the treaty, will meanwhile remain on our territory. It might be two,

three or four years, depending on how the situation develops, and depending on the signing of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons. There are many factors. [end recording]

**NWGF Commander on Withdrawal From Baltics**

92UN12954 Riga SM SEGODNYA in Russian  
24 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General V.I. Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, by IZVESTIYA correspondent Roman Bakalov; place and date not given: "If You Want Peace, Prepare for It"]

[Text] [Bakalov] Valeriy Ivanovich, the issue of the withdrawal of the Northwestern Group of Forces [NWGF] from the territory of the Baltic states is one of the key issues in solving the pressing problems of the three republics. However, the Baltic countries are raising this issue in a rather unambiguous form: When? You have repeatedly made statements in the press, including on the pages of SM SEGODNYA, on the absence of a precise schedule for the withdrawal of the troops. Could it be that the new status of the Northwestern Group of Forces presupposes some undercurrents of which the general public is unaware? In particular, as long as a military doctrine of Russia has not been set forth in a clear-cut manner, the presence of a foreign army on the territories of sovereign states may be interpreted in a variety of ways.

[Mironov] On this issue there are no undercurrents which are not in plain view. Whether we like it or not, processes of a political nature remain central to solving this problem. All the servicemen of the Northwestern Group of Forces, especially the officers and warrant officers, followed the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies with hope: they are awaiting responsible decisions from the parliaments of the Baltic countries. We, servicemen, are very interested to see which military policy will be proposed by the president, government, and parliament of Russia; a lot depends on it as far as the future of servicemen, especially career servicemen, is concerned. We cannot go on to particulars in the absence of an overall military doctrine. The objectives of the concept and defense tasks should be determined first, and structural issues resolved later.

At present, we have an ukase of the president of Russia on the creation of the Ministry of Defense. Decisions concerning the structure of the ministry and the concept of the defense of Russia are expected in the immediate future. The course of the negotiations between Russia and Latvia depends on this to a considerable degree. We may now state that they have reached a qualitatively new level; nonetheless, their productivity cannot satisfy either of the parties, especially ourselves, the subject of the negotiations.

Nobody has relieved the army of its responsibility for maintaining combat readiness and accomplishing combat tasks. We are doing everything for this to be reality rather than just words. However, even in the absence of results at the negotiations on the timing of troop withdrawal we have begun the process and will continue it. Even now we are handing over to the

Latvian side a portion of the vacated military settlements against the receipt of certain guarantees. As far as mutual settlements based on cost and assets are concerned, they should be specified by government delegations.

These issues and others, including legal protection for servicemen, are being resolved. We would like incidents such as the case of division commander Colonel Chernykh, who was unlawfully arrested in Lithuania, not to occur in Latvia.

[Bakalov] On the other hand, we may refer to a statement by S. Shakhray, which appeared in the press, to the effect that the presence of a foreign army on the territory of the Baltic states is a destabilizing factor.

[Mironov] I am not aware of such a statement. Even if it has been voiced, let the author be responsible for his words. The very fact of a presence is not the issue; the behavior of the two sides is. Throughout the world there have been no dearth of precedents for the presence of someone else's army on the territory of a sovereign state. Say, there are troops of the United States, France, and the CIS in Germany... However, so far I have not heard about the situation over there being destabilized by this. It is something else that has aggravated the situation: subjectively finding faults with the army which have been plucked out of thin air, for example, a recent protest note regarding a traffic accident in which servicemen were allegedly involved. But nothing of the sort ever took place.

[Bakalov] Incidentally, about protest notes. A good number have been addressed to Russia.

[Mironov] I must note that, outward respectability and the absence of any major complaints about us on the part of the Latvian leadership notwithstanding, there is still a tendency to sting on the sly and to play the anti-army card in order to placate the groups of a nationalist hue. All of us are mindful of the racket raised concerning the beginning of large-scale staff exercises. Meanwhile, we did not even intend to hold them.

They are simply trying to put us in a hopeless situation. I may show you about 30 instructions of the Republic of Latvia Council of Ministers on the acceptance, by a particular organization, of assets being used by the army. This begs the following question: On what grounds? Is it possible to make the people in uniform scapegoats and take it out on them because they ended up here—by the will of history rather than their own will? However, history cannot be reversed; everything should be resolved by civilized methods. Sit down at the negotiating table and discuss this. In the Northwestern Group of Forces there are no frenzied proponents of the concept of staying in the Baltic states forever. The interests of both sides should be taken into account, rather than only "one's own." Otherwise, the servicemen run the risk of being turned into pariahs. Their housing here is confiscated; in the other state, it is not available for now.

[Bakalov] However, Russia has turned down the assistance in building housing for officers' families which was proposed by Latvia.

[Mironov] Minister of Defense Mr. Jundzis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jurkans, and certain deputies of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Council have repeatedly voiced this idea. Actually, this is not in line with the truth, the issue is being raised differently: Latvia is prepared to provide assistance in the construction of housing on the territory of Russia... to be entirely financed by Russia. The Latvian side will provide assistance in terms of labor and construction materials. Incidentally, they also have to be paid for.

Given such an approach, any negotiations may come to an impasse. For example, Estonia altogether issued an ultimatum: According to unilaterally adopted laws we should leave behind all materiel and weapons. In this case, Estonia will not press claims for the damage inflicted, and will be prepared to sell to Russia its own materiel and weapons.

In Latvia a decision has also been made, likewise unilaterally, that the materiel and assets of the Northwestern Group of Forces on the territory of the republic constitute the property of the Latvian state. This is a legally invalid decision which runs counter to common sense.

[Bakalov] I doubt that the departing troops will need all the materiel and assets at their new deployment locations. Besides, it is perhaps just less expensive to leave something behind here.

[Mironov] Correct, and I see nothing bad in transferring or selling a portion of materiel and armaments to the Latvian side. However, this should be resolved by the government delegations.

Let us raise this question otherwise: What does Latvia need this amount of materiel and weapons for? Of course, I am not in a position to advise the leadership of the Republic of Latvia concerning the development of its military concept; this is an internal affair of the republic. However, just as in the case of Russia, which we mentioned at the very beginning of our conversation, objectives and tasks for the defense of Latvia should be determined first. To develop a doctrine, one needs to know who the enemy is. It is frightening if an army is created first, and a doctrine is made to fit it later.

I do not want to say by any means that aggressive designs are being nurtured here. The borders of Latvia and Russia will always be close, and no abyss will open up between our countries. All of us hope for good-neighbor relations, whereas the foundations of peaceful coexistence are not laid by slogans. It makes a difference for the Russians [Rossiyane] what kind of military policy Latvia will pursue, whether it will become a member of some military bloc or become purely neutral, or perhaps implement a defensive concept together with Russia. However, a transfer of tremendous amounts of materiel and armaments to Latvia will automatically make the

concept an offensive one. Or else these weapons will become a source for sales to other countries which, you would agree, does make a difference for the world community.

[Bakalov] You said that the withdrawal of troops continues and will continue. What stands in the way of speeding up this process?

[Mironov] This process cannot be interpreted in a simplified manner. A unit embarks on military trains or motor vehicles and leaves. There are about 120,000 servicemen on the territory of the Baltic republics—a tremendous number of people, plus materiel. Add to this the stocks of current rations which also need to be removed. Once a schedule for the provision of railway rolling stock is determined by treaties, we will be able to load in three shifts, around the clock. Besides, several units have already been disbanded; for example, the School imeni Marshal Biryuzov has left Riga almost entirely, only the senior class, which is taking examinations, remains. Airborne units have been withdrawn from the territories of Lithuania and Estonia. However, while the Latvian side calls for speeding up the withdrawal at all levels, it is slowing the withdrawal down itself. What about instructions from the Latvian customs department on restricting the export of personal effects on the pretext of officers allegedly removing construction materials? What kind of naive reasoning is this? Who is it intended for? Officers are entitled to ship out one cupboard, but they cannot ship out a second cupboard from a standard-issue set. One chair is allowed per family member, the rest is to be left behind... I must provide foodstuff's stored at central depots, and petro-chemicals and lubricants to the units being withdrawn. However, these units are frequently billeted in one republic while the warehouses are located in another, and there are "turnpikes" at the border. When this is about us having signed an agreement on withdrawal, and when I, along with my staff, can make specific scheduling plans, I will coordinate with the local organs procedures for the withdrawal, provision of railway rolling stock, and routes for the movement of motor vehicle convoys, and will announce how many containers, cars, etc., I need. I have all the basic data; all we need is to get to work.

May God grant us a rapid and smooth course of negotiations. We do not need either the Yugoslav or the Caucasian scenario. Let common sense prevail in the deeds of politicians. After all, the common people rather than the politicians themselves are the ones who will pay for the mistakes of the latter.

[Bakalov] Thank you for the conversation.

#### Further on Russian-Latvian Troop Withdrawal Talks

##### Talks Continue

LD2704105092 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0911 GMT 27 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandrs Budris]

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS—A regular round of meetings of expert groups—to draft an agreement between Russia and Latvia on terms, a time-frame and a procedure for a systematic withdrawal of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union from Latvian territory and on their legal status during the withdrawal period—opens in the Russian Foreign Ministry today, a spokesman at the press service of the Latvian Embassy in Russia told ITAR-TASS.

The expert groups are headed: On the Russian side by Ambassador Sergey Zotov, and on the Latvian side by Deputy Defence Minister Dainis Turlais.

As has already been reported, the troops of the former Soviet Union, stationed in the Baltics, are under Russia's jurisdiction. The number of servicemen in Latvia, according to various estimates, is from 45,000 to 60,000.

An understanding on the beginning of their withdrawal was reached during the visit by the state delegation of the Russian Federation to Riga on February 1.

The two previous meetings of the experts groups were held in Moscow and Riga in March.

##### 'Customs Regime' Issue Raised

LD2804084192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0730 GMT 28 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian delegation at the talks with Latvia has raised the issue of the measures directed toward thrusting "a kind of customs regime" upon Russian troops being rescinded without delay as "incompatible with the principle of sovereignty and the state's immunity which is conditional on this."

This was stated in an interview to the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Sergey Zotov, the head of the delegation of the Russian Federation at the talks with the Latvian Republic, and the charge d'affairs.

The third round of talks between Russian and Latvian experts to draw up an agreement on the conditions, dates and procedure for the systematic withdrawal of the armed forces of the former USSR which are under Russian jurisdiction from Latvian territory and on their legal regime started in Moscow on 27 April.

During the opening of the talks, Sergey Zotov said, the Russian delegation drew the Latvian side's attention to "the impermissibility and the illegality of imperious, unilateral, restrictive and prohibitive measures taken by Latvian customs bodies with regard to the Russian armed forces, which possess immunity." These measures, according to him, have manifested themselves in the establishment of customs posts around airports, Baltic Fleet bases, and the cantonment in Liepa.

The Russian side, the ambassador stressed, is starting to have doubts about whether Latvia will preserve its intention to seek mutually acceptable accords on all issues during the course of the talks, or whether it sees them as a sort of "curtain" under the cover of which they are making attempts "to achieve something by unilateral measures."

The Russian diplomat described the steps taken by the Latvian authorities as "being of a provocative nature."

The Latvian side informed the Russian delegation that this question would be settled in the near future. Sergey Zотов reported.

#### Latvian Representative Comments

LD2904192992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1717 GMT 29 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—In spite of an agreement which was reached earlier, Russia refused to produce a schedule for the withdrawal of its troops from Latvia. Latvian Deputy Defense Minister Daynis Turlais told journalists at a news conference here on Wednesday.

Turlais addressed the news conference after the third round of talks between Russia and Latvia on conditions of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia.

Latvian leaders believe Russia could withdraw its troops from Riga by October 1992 and by October 1993 from the rest of the Republic, Turlais said. Latvia will hold a general election in the autumn of 1993 and the presence of foreign troops can influence a free vote.

Latvian terms are absolutely inadmissible. Russian Ambassador to Latvia Sergey Zотов told ITAR-TASS. According to our experts, Russian military vehicles will have to move non-stop for a year and a half in order to carry all the equipment and personnel from Latvia. The delay with the schedule is caused by the desire to resolve the needs of the military.

#### Riga Seminar Discusses Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

Lithuanian, Estonian Representatives Complain  
OW2804223392 Moscow BALTEAX in English  
1846 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The delegations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania attending the International Seminar in Riga have put security in the Baltic countries in direct dependence on a speedy withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from that region. They maintain that the troops should be withdrawn by the end of 1992.

Baltfax has already reported that the International Seminar "Stability and Security in the Baltic Region" opened in Riga this Monday [27 April].

The Lithuanian representative complained about the continuing unsanctioned troops movements in the republic. The military authorities, he averred, obstruct the work of the border guards and forbid inspections of military facilities by the local or republican authorities. The Lithuanian side has not received any official information as regards the composition and armament of the forces stationed on the Lithuanian territory.

The representative of the Estonian delegation Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs Mr Indrek Toome informed the Seminar that the Russian troops occupy 80,000 hectares of the Estonian territory, their strength amounting to 25-27 thousand commissioned officers and enlisted men.

The cost of armaments and materiel of the Estonian Armed Forces appropriated by the Red Army in 1940 amounts to \$300 million according to the current prices. Tallinn raises a demand for reimbursement.

Indrek Toome stressed that Estonia is not capable of protecting itself by its own resources. Therefore, it is ready to join any international structure which can insure its security.

Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, CinC [commander in chief] North-Western Group of Forces, did not specify any dates for the troop withdrawal. He, however, emphasized that "the Baltic countries are seeking to acquire political capital, ultimately ignoring Russia's interests".

#### Latvian Chairman Gorbunovs Comments

OW2804174792 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1515 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin and edited by Boris Grishchenko; from issue No. 61 of the "Presidential Bulletin"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Parliament chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs regards the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops from the republican territory as the chief political issue. Speaking at an international seminar entitled "Stability And Security In The Baltic Region", organized by the North Atlantic Assembly and the Latvian Supreme Soviet, he said that the Latvian government was aware of the problems before Russia in connection with the relocation to Russia of the families of 17,000 commissioned officers. He said, however, that the providing for the needs of commissioned officers is Russia's problem. He said that Latvia dismissed all "provisions concerning Russian military strategic interests as Latvia cannot be a bridgehead for the protection of Russia against aggression by any other state."

Gorbunovs said that Latvia did not pretend to all the property of the army of the former USSR, it only wanted a return of a part that belonged to the Latvian armed forces before 1940.

IF's [INTERFAX] note: Participating in the seminar are NATO representatives, delegations of the North Atlantic Assembly, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus, and a delegation of the North Western group of troops under the command of the Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov.

### Tasks of Arms Reduction Center Described

PM2804133192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 28 Apr 92 p 1

[“Topical Interview” with Colonel Viktor Leshchenko, chief of the General-Purpose Forces Main Staff Center for Ensuring the Implementation of Arms Reduction Treaties, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev; place and date not given: “Coming Out of Disarmament Orbit”—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] In most European countries preparations to reduce combat equipment are in progress in accordance with the CFE Treaty, signed in November 1990 by the leaders of 22 states including the USSR. In our country this process is being tracked in the General-Purpose Forces by the Center for Ensuring the Implementation of Arms Reduction Treaties, which has been set up in their Main Staff.

Organizational changes are planned in the military department in connection with the formation of the Russian Armed Forces and a Russian ministry. Could it be that verification of the disarmament process will disappear? Our correspondent put this question to the center's chief, Colonel Viktor Leshchenko.

[Leshchenko] We hope that observance of the treaties signed by the USSR will continue to be verified. It is premature to talk about our center's place in the newly created Russian defense structures, since they have not been confirmed. If the problem is looked at rationally, the center—albeit a reformed one—must be preserved. Russia needs a centralized treaty implementation control system, including links in the Defense Ministry, General Staff, branches of Armed Forces, military districts, and divisions. Formations of territorially-based full-time mobile groups, subordinate to the General Staff and operating in the interests of all branches of Armed Forces, will also be needed.

[Dokuchayev] Viktor Borisovich, will your center not be duplicating the activity of the National Center for Reducing Nuclear Danger? Russia does not need duplication; the Army is being reduced, command structures are being reduced...

[Leshchenko] Our center is not a control structure; it was set up to organize the provision of backup for international agreements in the Ground Forces. While the

National Center for Reducing Nuclear Danger, which came into being following the 1987 agreement between the USSR and the United States, tackles tasks corresponding to its title. It performs verification functions regarding fulfillment of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, conducts preparations for work on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons, and tackles problems associated with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Kazakh territory to Russia and their storage and destruction.

But conventional weapons...They are currently being widely used on CIS territory in military conflicts in which people are dying. Meeting the requirements of the CFE Treaty is a multifaceted task whose distinctive peculiarities are a large number of monitored sites, a considerable range of categories and types of weapons, intense inspection activity, and an unprecedented military equipment reduction volume.

In short, the centers are tackling different tasks, which determines their organizational and establishment structure.

[Leshchenko] One last question. How do matters stand regarding the declarations by leaders of the former USSR, which were, after all, made to the whole world

[Leshchenko] They must be fulfilled. The USSR Government declaration of 14 June last year on limiting the amount of Coast Guard and Naval Infantry weapons is valid within the confines of the CFE Treaty's area of application. Based on the conclusions of an analysis by our specialists, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine are evidently faced with cutting around 900 combat tanks, around 1,700 armored fighting vehicles, and around 1,000 artillery pieces. The USSR representative's declaration of 14 June 1991 on additional unilateral undertakings to cut at least 6,000 tanks, 1,500 armored fighting vehicles, and 7,000 artillery pieces available beyond the Urals must be fulfilled by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.

The center is elaborating the criteria for the approach toward the Commonwealth states' participation in implementing the undertakings. We are ready to cooperate in this question with colleagues from our nearby foreign parts.

### Troop Talks With Lithuania, Latvia Viewed

PM2904141992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 29 Apr 92 p 3

[Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report under “Direct Line” rubric: “Third Meeting of Experts Did Not Produce Results Either. Lithuania Insists on Immediate Withdrawal of Russian Troops”—last paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA afterword]

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Apr—"Unfortunately, Russia still does not want to discuss the final date for its army's withdrawal, its timing or schedule, or compensation for the harm done to Lithuania and its citizens." Minister Aleksandras Abisala declared after the third meeting of experts of the Lithuanian and Russian state delegations concerning our army's withdrawal from Lithuania. Meetings were held at the Foreign Ministry over two days. Lithuania's group of experts was headed by Minister Aleksandras Abisala, and Russia's by Viktor Isakov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

Abisala also pointed out that it was not possible even to ascertain Russia's position on these questions, and so it is impossible to continue discussing fine technical details. He believes that the state delegations must provide the answer to the most important political questions. A date has not yet been set for their meeting.

Viktor Isakov, head of the group of Russian experts, in turn declared that the timing of the troop withdrawal was discussed at the meeting, but it is still impossible today to speak of many complex technical and economic questions or of when and how Russia's army will be withdrawn from Lithuania. We do not want to indicate times but not keep to them. Isakov remarked. Replying to a question about who owes what to whom by way of compensation, the ambassador pointed out that neither side has yet presented its accounts with regard to property claims. Russian specialists have prepared such data, however.

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Supreme Council session has spent several days discussing a draft resolution on the holding of a referendum on the urgent withdrawal of troops of the former USSR from the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and on compensation for the harm done to Lithuania. It is planned to hold it 14 June.

Incidentally, the latest meeting of expert groups from Russia and Latvia, which began in Moscow 27 April, was devoted to the preparation of an agreement on the terms of the temporary stay of troops of the former USSR and on their withdrawal from Latvia. The Russian side is headed by Sergey Zotov, deputy chief of a Foreign Ministry administration, and the Latvian side by Deputy Defense Minister Dainis Turlais.

## NUCLEAR TESTING

### Yeltsin Comments on Novaya Zemlya Moratorium

1D2804155992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1505 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Report by special ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Excerpt] Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast), 28 Apr—Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia, declared today during a meeting with the people of Severodvinsk, a satellite town near Arkhangelsk, that the Severodvinsk base was

"the national wealth of all Russia and not only we will not allow it to die, but we will also strengthen it." Some of the country's largest enterprises that build nuclear submarines are situated here, on the shores of the White Sea. Yeltsin noted that even if other enterprises were to stop producing submarines, their production would continue in Severodvinsk.

Speaking at a request from the population about the problem of the testing ground on Novaya Zemlya, the president, who is presently on a tour of a number of Russian towns, declared that the moratorium on nuclear tests remained in force. For the first time, he said, France is supporting us by declaring its own moratorium on nuclear tests. The president underlined that now Russia and France could exert strong pressure on the United States to end tests. At the same time, he added that Russia could not allow its national safety to be undermined. According to Yeltsin, during his official visit to Washington in June of this year "talks will be held on either a complete ban on nuclear tests," that Russia is pressing for, "or on minimum level and quantity for them, for example two explosions per year, rather than 17, as had been planned." [passage omitted]

## CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

### General Quizzed on Chemical Weapons Production

PM2704095192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
17 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Interview with Medical Service General V.I. Yevstugneyev, candidate of medical sciences and chief of the Directorate for Protection Against Biological Weapons, by Aleksandr Pashkov, place and date not given: "Military Deny Involvement in Mysterious Illness. Chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces Top Secret Military Laboratories Answers Journalist's Questions for the First Time"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Yekaterinburg, Moscow—Certain IZVESTIYA articles ("How They 'Innoluated' Us With Anthrax," "I Know Where the Sverdlovsk Anthrax Came From," and "End of the Anthrax Legend in the Urals") have recounted the tragedy that took place in Sverdlovsk in 1979. At that time dozens of people died of anthrax in Chkalovskiy Rayon where Military Camp 19 was located.

The newspaper carried two versions of how the outbreak of the disease occurred. Survivors, and also relatives of those who died, physicians, and former KGB staffers claim that the anthrax was of artificial origin, the virus was cultivated in a military laboratory. Academician P. Burgasov, who headed the government commission at the time, indicates that the cause of the outbreak was the use in food of animal meat that had become infected via carelessly maintained carcass burial sites where the remains of diseased cows were buried in the past.

However, the position of military biological scientists and those who organized the activity of the relevant laboratories was missing from these articles. Our correspondent visited Camp 19 and talked with the scientists, with General A. Kharechko, chief of the microbiological scientific research center, and then with Medical Service General V.I. Yevstigneyev, candidate of medical sciences and chief of the Directorate for Protection Against Biological Weapons.

[Pashkov] Valentin Ivanovich, first of all I must apologize for a big mistake. I wrote that V. Mikhaylov, former chief of Camp 19, committed suicide. I based this on claims made by extremely senior officials who, it is alleged, actively associated with the general at the time. But in fact he died in hospital of cancer....

[Yevstigneyev] I am sure that, had it not been for the fatal illness of this most experienced biologist and organizer of military science, many things would have turned out differently. At the time senior officials from Moscow simply intimidated his deputy. They isolated the camp and put it in quarantine. They immediately decided that all the infection came from there, you see. The security organs and the sanitary services created such an atmosphere of secrecy and intimidation around the population that there was no longer any doubt about it—he was to blame for the tragedy...Now they write that we almost gleefully monitored everything that happened, that we "verified" our research. But we were simply denied access to everything! We only found out later, for example, that the carcasses of slain animals were taken to furnaces at a ceramics plant in order to incinerate them. Every military physician knows that it is useless to incinerate meat infected with anthrax, even using napalm—you will not destroy the pathogen's spores located in the fat of the carcass by burning them.

[Pashkov] Nevertheless, the physicians claim that the anthrax affected people via respiratory channels. If they used the meat, why did their throats, lungs, and other organs become diseased?

[Yevstigneyev] This is certainly no mystery to specialists who work with anthrax. In broad outline it happens like this: The pathogens get into the blood via erosion of the throat, alimentary tract, lungs, mouth, and so on. Therefore not only the stomach, but frequently the respiratory channels are affected too. After all, people were affected in different ways, but today pulmonary cases are the most widespread since this supports the claim that a pathogen of artificial origin was "discharged" into the atmosphere. You have been to the camp and seen for yourself: There are residential districts between the rayon limit and the production block. So didn't the local inhabitants realize what they were threatened with?

[Pashkov] I cannot tell a lie. I had doubts about this version of events, but...documents and hard facts are needed. Do you think these will emerge?

[Yevstigneyev] At the moment the only thing we can be clear about is that, prompted by foreign and domestic

information services and supported by ill-qualified directors, work on developing a more effective anthrax vaccine was suspended for several years in 1980, and the Sverdlovsk plant that produced vaccines and diagnostic substances was closed down. We became victims of the former state's supersecrecy and the absence of laws regulating this sort of activity.

But the facts may emerge. Crime specialists are familiar with the method of identifying biological entities, which in popular literature is called the genetic fingerprinting method. Every strain has its own "physiognomy." These can simply be compared. Armed with these techniques, we must analyze samples from carcass burial sites, the graves of those who died, and also from the soil of the territory adjoining Camp 19, and then we will be able to establish the objective truth. This will be expensive, however. But I realize that today it is more important to resolve issues of social protection for people who lost breadwinners in 1979.

[Pashkov] Valentin Ivanovich, in line with the 1972 Geneva Convention, there is a U.S. federal law dated 22 May 1990 which regulates the activity of institutions that have the potential to produce bacteriological weapons. Does it not seem to you that the absence of such a law in our country creates preconditions for the emergence of critical situations?

[Yevstigneyev] We are in favor of such a law. If the state needs weapons of defense, and at the present time the danger of an uncontrollable proliferation of biological weapons is noticeably on the increase, there should be a clear-cut regulatory document defining our activity.

On the other hand, adopting a law does not remove many of the problems. If you were to study the U.S. law, your attention would be drawn to two facts: It is directed against physical and not juridical persons. For example if some scientist were to start manufacturing biological weapons at his own risk he would be punished. If, however, he were to do this within a state structure, then nobody would bear the responsibility. And something else: This law is not restricted to scientific research or even development conducted for the purposes of preventive medicine. And the distinction between a "peaceful" and "combat" microbe is very arbitrary....

[Pashkov] On a computer screen at Camp 19 I was shown all the institutions in the world that could get directly or indirectly involved in bacteriological weapons. The computer gave out information on every one of them—the likelihood in percentage terms of their being engaged in scientific and practical work on bacteriological weapons. So is there a technique that can be used by specialists for monitoring purposes?

[Yevstigneyev] There are major preconditions. However, these should be enacted at international level. Bacteriological weaponry is the "atom bomb" of poor countries. While the United States spends up to \$100 million in the area of biology and we spend 70 million rubles, it is not known how much is spent on this in

so-called "closed" countries. The war in the Persian Gulf showed that all kinds of situations are possible in the world, this must not be forgotten. I will not make a secret of it, there are instances of certain military biologists receiving invitations from various foreign representatives of Third World countries to go and work for them.

[Pashkov] Has the process of the formation of sovereign states affected the activity of your institutions?

[Yevstigneyev] The Kazakh Government has brought the activity of the field scientific and test laboratory located on Vozrozhdeniye island in the Aral Sea under its control. We are proposing a more fundamental decision—that this institution be shut down.

[Pashkov] One last point. Is a "Chernobyl" possible in the sphere of activity in which you are engaged?

[Yevstigneyev] As regards the Microbiology Scientific Research Institute in Yekaterinburg, which is under my jurisdiction, I can say that the likelihood of some sort of incident that might endanger the health of the surrounding population is practically zero. A "quiet" tragedy might occur if, as a result of the present political passions, our scientists find themselves out of a job or get involved in commercial activity. We can only hope that stabilization will come about before everything collapses once and for all. We are attempting to act in a more vigorous fashion, to look for income "on the side," as the saying goes, and thus keep our people. For example, we have an entirely realistic plan to set up a production facility for antibacteriological agents based on the Yekaterinburg center.

However, we must clearly understand that without an antibacteriological defense system, the state's security and defense capability cannot be guaranteed. This certainly does not contradict the convention. After all, it would probably not occur to anyone to take gas masks out of army service just because the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had been adopted.

#### Udmurts Worry on Lewisite Recycling Plans

924P01284 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 17, 20-27 Apr 92 p 14

[Article by Viktor Lyubich and Aleksey Luzhbin: "Udmurtiya Intends to Give Arsenic to the Nations. What Dose Is Unknown For the Time Being"]

[Text] The government of Udmurtiya hopes to do business in the sale of metallic arsenic to foreign partners. It is proposed to obtain the arsenic from the processing of poison gas (lewisite) stored at one of the military bases.

On 20 April a study group specially created under the government and the Supreme Soviet of Udmurtiya announced a contest for the best design of an enterprise for the processing of lewisite into arsenic. The results of the contest will be summed up by the Conventional

#### Committee for Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons under the president of Russia.

Lewisite is a poison gas of skin-blister action obtained as the result of the interaction of acetylene with trichloride arsenic in the presence of catalysts.

Metallic arsenic is used as an additive in alloys of copper, lead, and others, and gives them useful qualities.

On the territory of a military unit in Kambarskiy Rayon of Udmurtiya, almost the entire world's supply of lewisite—7,000 tonnes is found. This is sufficient, according to the claim of specialists, to poison 280 trillion people, which exceeds approximately 50,000 times the population of the Earth.

Scientists, however, are examining the possibilities of a more humane, and, what is the main thing, a more profitable use of the lewisite—of reverse processing of it into metallic arsenic, a raw material quite competitive on the world market. The possible profit from the sale of arsenic obtained from the Udmurt supplies is estimated by some specialists at \$7-8 billion.

A decree of the Supreme Soviet and the government of Udmurtiya also provides for the creation of a joint stock company, which will engage in the commercial sale of lewisite. It is proposed that the winner of the contest, the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the Council of Ministers of Udmurtiya, the ispolkom of the Kambarskiy Rayon Soviet, and the organizations financing the project will become the founders of the joint stock company.

According to the testimony of local observers, a bitter struggle has developed over the right to receive supplies of lewisite for commercial use. The chairman of the Commission for Ecology of the Supreme Soviet of Udmurtiya, Sergey Shchukin, said that the authorities have received the most diverse proposals from commercial structures, the names of which have not been disclosed for the time being. The scientists of the Physical-Technical Institute of the Urals Branch of the Academy of Sciences of Russia are studying the development of the technology in this sphere; they also organized the Public Committee to Free Udmurtiya of Chemical Weapons.

The military, as the observers assert, are not giving in to the "lewisite euphoria." In particular, the deputy commander of the chemical troops of the CIS, Maj Gen Igor Yevstafyev, said that for the time being there are not even technical-economic justifications for the processing of the lewisite. It is also not clear where this installation will be located—in the Kambarka settlement itself such an enterprise cannot be since this region is densely populated and the Kama River flows nearby. Yevstafyev believes that the elaboration of the feasibility studies will require 2 years, another 5-6 years will be needed for the construction of a transportation terminal, the processing plant itself, and the start-up and adjustment work. The general was unable to make an estimate of the approximate cost of the project, but by way of example he cited

the creation of a complex for the destruction of poison gas in a region of Chapayevsk. The complex cost R50 million, took 3 years to build, and in the end, because of the protests by the public, was reprofiled into an educational center.

Still another problem is the burial of waste materials. The practice of the operation of an experimental plant in the village of Kambarka showed that the processing of 1 tonne of lewisite produces 6-7 tonnes of arsenic-containing waste materials. Moreover, the specialists studying the problem of lewisite could not answer the question of correspondent "b": How much Udmurt arsenic can the world market absorb?

Telephone number of the Commission for Ecology of the Supreme Soviet of Udmurtiya:

(3412) 75-02-65

### Biological Weapons Conversion Considered

PM2804103992 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
27 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Yeltsin Bans Work on Bacteriological Weapons. This Means: Work Was Under Way, And We Were Deceived"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree "On Ensuring the Implementation of International Pledges in the Sphere of Biological Weapons." It bans the development and implementation of biological programs in violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Let us note: The presidential decree was published exactly 20 years after our country signed the convention prohibiting the development of these dreadful weapons. The USSR ratified it in 1975. But throughout this period we have not had a single legal document regulating and demarcating such a subtle and delicate sphere as bacteriological research.

Incidentally, the Americans adopted a law stating what work can be carried out with a view to providing defense against these weapons, including research involving highly dangerous microorganisms, toxins, and other components, allowing the use of mockups of munitions and spray devices, and stating categorically what was not allowed. That is, they strictly defined the amount of authorized activity. We had no such law. President Yeltsin's decree is the first step in this area.

Admittedly, so Russian military experts assert, we have no problems with destroying bacteriological weapons since there are no stockpiles of these weapons in Russia, although we have carried out research and experimental-design work on them. We tested them in laboratories and even, in very diluted doses, at a special test site which has now been shut down and handed over to the national

economy after the appropriate control inspections. Scientists claim that it is quite safe. The increase in the wild animal population living on its territory is evidence of this. Needless to say, that argument needs careful checking.

Yes, the task of effective supervision [kontrol] of the scientific centers where work on bacteriological weapons was carried out does exist. It must be performed by the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons set up by Boris Yeltsin's decree.

This committee's senior personnel think that verification of the implementation of the convention can be not only Russian but also international—in the form of mixed groups. Both on a bilateral basis—Russian-U.S. or Russian-British groups, for instance—and on a multilateral basis. Naturally, this must be reciprocal verification.

In order for this to occur our specialists are proposing unprecedented steps to promote openness, confidence-building, and the broadening of international cooperation that were not even mentioned in the 1972 Convention. They also consider these measures an element in the planet's global security. Our scientists are willing to invite foreign experts to what were until recently highly secret research centers in Kirov, Yekaterinburg, and Sergiyev Posad working for the military. They are proposing to carry out joint evaluation of the programs and to formulate a unified policy for switching them to a peaceful footing.

The point is that biological conversion does not necessitate major expenditure. Strains, serums, vaccines, and other output developed previously can with comparative ease become the basis of new medical preparations. The money spent on biological weapons research will not have been wasted, it will start to work for people. .

Such programs already exist. The Yekaterinburg center's buildings and laboratories are being transferred to medicine production. It is already ready to produce medicine. A special program is also being formulated for the institute at Sergiyev Posad, which develops vaccines that are of great interest to foreign countries. Our specialists claim that during the Gulf war the Americans were studying the possibility of buying these vaccines because of their great effectiveness. Scientists at the center in Kirov are also working successfully on conversion and are providing their city with great assistance in creating its agro-industrial complex.

Experts from the Committee for Convention Problems consider that these institutes must in time be removed from the tutelage of the military. The highly professional scientific forces created there and their experience are a federal asset and must switch entirely to work in the national economy. Only they must be helped to set up a unified science and production complex that will be able to fully recoup its costs and bring the state a return.

Our "secret" scientists' developments may reach the international market, displacing traditional foreign participants and thus earn hard currency for Russia.

### Delays in Chemical Weapon Disarmament Viewed

PM2804131792 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
28 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Soviet Union Failed To Fulfill Chemical Disarmament Agreement. Russia Takes Over Its Obligations. Yeltsin's Men Seek Agreement in United States and at Home"]

[Text] The destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles on our country's territory should begin before 31 December 1992. But it is already clear that, for a number of reasons, the agreement signed between the USSR and the United States will not be fulfilled on schedule. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree setting up a Committee on the Convention [konvensionalnyj] Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich has been appointed its chairman.

Our committee's task, the academician told *IZVESTIYA*'s correspondent, is to implement internal presidential verification of the observance of the convention obligations which the Union and Russia—as its successor—undertook, and to take part in multilateral and bilateral forms of international verification. The main point is to actually get down to eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles and creating the scientific, technical, and material base to that end.

There are around 40,000 tonnes of stocks of chemical agents in our country. They are all on Russian territory. And although production of them ended back in 1987 and preparations for their destruction began even earlier, little has yet been done.

Why? The former Union Supreme Soviet and central government were unable to ratify the agreement between the USSR and the United States, nor did they ratify the state program for the destruction of chemical weapons—the necessary funds were not allocated. Even today we do not yet have any legal documents obliging state organs to launch this work.

According to Academician Kuntsevich, the committee set up by the president is currently drawing up a strategy for carrying out the international obligations we have undertaken. What is its aim? To draw up a number of governmental documents which would make it possible to create a material and technical basis for chemical disarmament and begin the elimination of such weapons.

There is already one chemical weapons destruction installation in the country. It is sited near Chapayevsk in Samara Oblast. The committee chairman—and his words are backed up by foreign experts—claims that this

plant meets all the demands of technology and environmental and medical safety, and is located a considerable distance away from major population centers. The installation was to have helped the country develop the technology for destroying chemical agents. But, owing to protests from the oblast population and leadership, the 100 million rubles [R] invested in setting up the plant have been wasted. Chapayevsk has not started operations.

Today, Anatoliy Kuntsevich believes, we need to first provide social guarantees for the population of those oblasts and rayons where chemical disarmament installations will be built, allocate additional funds to develop the infrastructure, set up a social and consumer sector, build schools, hospitals, and other buildings, hold talks with people, convince them of the absolute safety of the technologies under development, and only then start work.

Of course, the academician believes that people working at and living alongside installations for the destruction and salvage of chemical weapons should have prior guarantees from the president or the government that they will receive higher wages and other material and social benefits, to render their participation in solving the convention problems advantageous and comprehensively safeguarded.

It is planned to spend 30 percent of the entire sum allocated to chemical disarmament—as well as virtually all the foreign investment which the state hopes to receive for this purpose—on this. Academician Kuntsevich believes that the chemical agents destruction program will cost Russia a total of R100 billion at current prices.

It is planned to build several chemical agent destruction installations on Russian territory, but the committee is not saying where. Their view is: First we will obtain the documentation guaranteeing benefits, hold talks with people, obtain their agreement, and only then can we name specific rayons or oblasts.

The program and timetable for destroying or processing chemical agents will directly depend on the results of domestic talks, as will even the committee's strategy, as will the choice of methods for salvaging chemical weapons and the ultimate expenditure involved.

Destroying chemical agents is an expensive process. Particularly at the initial stage. But unique technologies have already been developed which make it possible to obtain the maximum economic benefit from, for instance, turning lewisite into high-quality arsenic, or organophosphorus compounds into safe liquids suited to the technical processing of timber or capable of enhancing the quality of construction materials, concrete.... And it would not be necessary to build huge and expensive boilers to incinerate neutralized chemical agents, nor would there be any excessive impact on the atmosphere....

Incidentally, the Americans too have already realized that it is uneconomical to incinerate chemical agents.

Academician Kuntsevich said that scientists have clearly calculated that the spending on chemical disarmament could be recouped—if not completely, at least substantially. They will lay the foundation for the development of scientific research work and new technological achievements in developing the chemical industry.

In the academician's opinion, the "Gordian knot" of legal, financial, social, and psychological problems involved in chemical disarmament should be cut by Russia no later than May this year, on the eve of President Yeltsin's visit to the United States. Incidentally, on 27 April a delegation from the Committee on Convention Problems is to fly to the United States to hold talks on elaborating joint programs to destroy chemical agents in our country.

"The fate of major scientific and production programs, and Russia's prestige in the international arena," Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich said, "now depend on our population's readiness to cooperate with our committee."

If we are successful in winning people's agreement to start work on destroying chemical agents, such work could only begin at best in mid-1993. But their agreement is the only way out of the chemical disarmament impasse.

### CIS, U.S. Help Sought in Chemical Destruction

PM2804150192 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
28 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Major General (Retired) Vladimir Belous, expert on chemical weapons, and Rostislav Sergeyev, chairman of the Foreign Policy Association's Environmental Safety Council: "Destroying the Silent Death Cleverly, Without Delay"]

[Text] The statement by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin 29 January this year, along with a reaffirmation of adherence to the signed Soviet-U.S. agreement on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons contains a highly perplexing conclusion about the need to amend the previously agreed timetable for the destruction of these weapons. What is going on? What lies behind this forced admission?

As is well known, during the Wyoming meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers in the fall of 1989 the sides signed a memorandum on their stockpiles of chemical agents, storage sites, and production facilities. In the following year an agreement was signed containing specific pledges by the sides and a timetable specifying a relatively tight schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons. Thus both sides should embark on destroying chemical weapons not later than 31 December 1992, by the year 2000 no less than 50 percent of stocks should have been destroyed, and by the end of 2002 Russia and

the United States should each have no more than 5,000 tonnes of chemical agents left. If a convention is signed, Russia—along with all the other countries—will completely destroy its chemical agents and give up these mass destruction weapons forever.

Examining the reasons for Russia's reluctance to carry out the schedule for the destruction of chemical agents, we need above all to point to the fact that when the agreement was signed there was in existence a unified state—the USSR—which at the time had sufficient financial and economic potential, the necessary production capacity, and a high level of scientific and technical potential. Those who participated in preparing the agreement proceeded on this basis when setting the timetable for the weapons' destruction. But the emergence of sovereign republics shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sharp slump in industrial production, and the start of economic reform sharply exacerbated the problem....

In the opinion of independent experts, the plant built in the Chapayevsk region for the experimental development of technologies involved in chemical weapons destruction has ensured a high degree of efficiency and environmental safety. But a failure to take account of purely psychological factors and an inability to conduct preparatory explanatory work among the population of adjacent areas led to massive protests. As a result, the plant was converted into a center to train those involved in chemical weapons elimination. Until recently no site had been picked for the construction of a new plant, and you get the impression that certain officials cannot decide to take responsibility and make their choice.

Currently this "all-Union" task is having to be decided by Russia alone, which is already in a very complex economic position.

Historically, it is a fact that all chemical weapons, storage facilities, and production sites are located in Russia. The other former USSR republics have now suggested that Russia resolve everything, and the expense will be considerable. Thus, according to expert estimates, the cost of all the work to destroy chemical weapons was assessed at 5.4 billion rubles [R] at the time when the agreement was signed, but now stands at R28-30 billion in early 1992 prices. Would it not be sensible to share this burden among the Commonwealth members? We think that during a discussion of military issues with the other CIS states the Russian delegation should submit for examination and resolution the problem of their fair participation in financing the destruction of chemical weapons.

The Soviet-U.S. agreement highlights two fundamental points: First, in the destruction of chemical agents, technologies should be used to ensure that the end product is not a chemical agent itself and cannot be used as a starting point for the synthesis of new toxic compounds. Second, in the process of eliminating chemical agents there should be inbuilt environmental safety

guarantees. In particular, it is forbidden to incinerate chemical agents in the open air, to bury them in the ground, or to dump them at sea.

Apart from postponing the timetable for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, we will have to reach agreement with the Americans on not destroying our factories which previously produced chemical weapons. The fact is that these production facilities, like most defense complex enterprises, are equipped with modern technology and have a developed infrastructure and a high scientific and technical potential. But the most important point is that these plants have already been converted to civil chemical production—something that the Russian national economy greatly needs.

We agree to international expert verification with on-site inspections at former chemical weapons production facilities on the principle of "any time, any place." But in the current very complex economic situation we can hardly afford the luxury of destroying plants that cost billions of rubles in total.

This position of Russia's is all the more justifiable because the United States has in recent years organized production of components for so-called binary chemical weapons, which separately contain two relatively harmless chemical compounds. The features of binary weapons make it much harder to monitor their production, because the initial components are manufactured at civilian chemical plants and can be used, for instance, as plant protection agents or in pharmaceuticals. These are essentially chemical agents with a dual role—civil and military.

The Soviet delegation at the talks was unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from the U.S. side to the proposals to introduce a system for monitoring this U.S. military chemical technology "know-how." The U.S. representatives refuse to divulge details of the components of binary weapons, hiding behind commercial secrecy—which essentially makes their production unverifiable. Incidentally, the problem of verifying the production and destruction of binary weapons could be examined during work on the convention currently under way in Geneva.

What is the current state of play with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia? How are the scientific, technical, and organizational issues connected with this problem being resolved? These problems were meaningfully discussed during hearings at the Foreign Policy Association. Eminent chemists, diplomats who had taken part in the Soviet-U.S. talks, representatives of the Russian Defense Affairs Committee, experts from the Directorate of the Chief of Chemical Troops, and representatives of the public were invited to the session.

The representatives from the Directorate of the Chief of Chemical Troops explained that the elaborated draft state program is based on a comprehensive approach:

Chemical agents which can be salvaged should be reprocessed; those which cannot should be destroyed. In other words, not everything can be salvaged and not everything need be destroyed.

An example of effective salvage work is the plan to obtain the high-purity arsenic needed to manufacture a highly promising semiconductor material—gallium arsenide. This was reported by *IZVESTIYA* No. 70 this year.

The world community is having to face up the task of putting a stop once and for all to the chemical arms race and destroying all stockpiles of chemical agents under strict international control. Mankind simply has no sensible alternative.

## NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

### Navy Missile Arsenal To Be 'Radically' Reduced

LD2704163192 Moscow *POSTFACTUM* in English  
1553 GMT 27 Apr 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Moscow—The Russian military reportedly plan to retain 100 ocean-going vessels, 200 speedboats, 300 aircraft and 50 diesel submarines. On April 27 *PF* [*POSTFACTUM*] also learned from well-informed sources that the Russian navy wants to have the same number of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles as was in the Soviet navy. According to chief specialist of the parliament Commission for Defense and Security, Anatoliy Novikov, the composition of the Russian fleet, elaborated by the chief headquarters of the navy, does not provide for proper reductions and will hardly be accepted for consideration by parliament. According to the military doctrine, which is still being drafted, preference will be given to ground-based strategic nuclear forces that are less expensive and easier to control internationally. The navy's nuclear missile arsenal will be radically reduced.

## REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

### Further Reports, Commentaries on Ukrainian Withdrawal Stance

Foreign Minister Cited on Limited Storage Life  
4U2704075092 Kiev *MOLOD UKRAYINY*  
in *Ukrainian* 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Commentary by Olena Hubina: "Nuclear Missiles, Like Food Supplies, Have Limited Storage Terms"]

[Text] There is now less talk abroad about the division of the property of the former USSR, because it seems that Russia shows extreme dislike for this kind of talk. We

hear that Russo-Polish joint ventures are being created in Poland on the basis of that property. Confidently pursuing a policy toward the succession of the Union, Russia, at a recent meeting of leaders of external political departments of Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, expressed a desire to be a single legal "other side" to the American-Soviet treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons that was signed in 1990. Ukraine offered its own view of the situation: Four nuclear weapons must figure as a single "other side." It seems that Kazakhstan tends to support Ukraine's stand and Belarus gravitates toward Russia. Thus, all the parties went in their own directions, everybody adhering to his own ideas.

Ukraine is again ready to transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction, but all of this must proceed under international supervision. Ukraine's minister of foreign affairs Anatoliy Zlenko reassured opponents of "the transfer of the nuclear potential into the hands of an aggressor" in this way: Russia will not be able to keep them forever, because, like food, they have limited storage terms after which they become extremely dangerous. These are not embassy buildings that only need to be repaired in time to serve Russia forever.

### Kravchuk Sets Conditions for Elimination

LD2204164492 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 22 Apr 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] President Kravchuk has declared that Ukraine will sign an interstate treaty with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the United States on the elimination of nuclear weapons on three conditions: If the world community supports the state's nonnuclear policy, provides financial assistance, and guarantees the security of a disarmed Ukraine.

### Receives INF Medal, Repeats Nuclear-Free Vow

OW2304234792 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1630 GMT 23 Apr 92

[From "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [22 April] President Leonid Kravchuk was decorated with a medal of ICS corporation honoring the destruction of US and Soviet medium-range missiles. Medal No. 31 was handed in Kiev by the president of the company Richard Siles.

A total of 900 medals were made in December 1987 at the Moscow mint from the metal of destroyed missiles at orders from ICS. They are meant for statesmen and politicians who have made a special contribution to nuclear disarmament.

At the ceremony President Kravchuk said that Ukraine firmly observes the status of a peaceful nuclear-free state

and stressed that it "invites all businessmen who would want to be truly involved in the advancement of its economy."

Richard Siles who has made many business visits to Ukraine said that in his opinion the independent country has a good economic future and its opening to the world will promote its transformation into an economic power.

### Spokesman Confirms Goal at CSCE

LD2304204392 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in English 2100 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Text] Ukraine has proclaimed its dedication to the idea of becoming a nuclear-free, nonaligned, and, in perspective, a neutral state. This was declared at the meeting with journalists by the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine Volodymyr (?Lapinskyy) commenting on the results of our republic's participation in the meeting of the countries, members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], which was held in Helsinki. Volodymyr (?Lapinskyy) said that the Ukrainian delegation became the co-author of the proposal on undertaking peacekeeping operations within the framework of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe as an effective instrument.

### Defense Minister on U.S. Visit

LD2204215292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1950 GMT 22 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaitsev—TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 22 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Ukraine is ready to implement all commitments under the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to adhere to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of the republic, stated. He held a news conference today on the results of the visit by a Ukrainian military delegation to the United States.

The defense minister stated that while the process of the limitation of strategic offensive arms is being implemented, Ukraine insists upon having the status of an equal side. As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, international monitoring [kontrol] of their withdrawal, stockpiling, and destruction is necessary, the minister noted.

The delegation met Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and other U.S. political and military leaders during its visit to the United States. Questions of mutual relations between the two countries in the military and other spheres were discussed. The delegation put forward Ukraine's position on the main problems of the military and political situation in the republic and familiarized the American side with the republic's defense policy and military doctrines. The economic situation in Ukraine was also outlined. The military delegation affirmed once again

that the republic excludes the use of force in deciding any political, economic and other questions.

The minister of defense also briefed the news conference on the conclusion of an agreement between the military departments of Ukraine and Hungary. A Ministry of Defense delegation of the republic is presently in Czechoslovakia, where a similar agreement is due to be signed. Drafts of such agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania are being examined. These countries, Konstantin Morozov stressed, link their security with Ukraine's independence.

The work of the delegation affirmed, Konstantin Morozov noted in conclusion, that Ukraine is open to mutual relations with other states, including ties with their armed forces.

#### Views Foreign Perceptions, Withdrawal Timetable

LD2304201792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino Television First Program Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Apr 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] If everything is now distinct and clear regarding the ground forces and the Russian Army, the issue of the Fleet still raises many questions. The Ukrainian and the Russian defense ministers have expressed their views on its future in Kiev and Moscow today.

[Correspondent Lyaskalo, identified by caption] Colonel General Morozov, the Ukrainian defense minister, has described his official visit to the United States as very successful. His meetings and talks with leaders of the U.S. military and foreign policy departments were fruitful, he said. I am convinced, Konstantin Morozov said, that Ukraine is now being perceived as an independent and self-reliant state and as a guarantor of stability in Eastern Europe. Its firm policy of total nuclear disarmament can serve as a good example for other nuclear powers. The minister told the correspondents that right after his return from the United States on 21 April he signed a timetable for continuing the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory under international supervision. This class of weapons includes the nuclear warheads that have already been removed from the warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

#### Spokesman Denies Western Pressure

LD2204222992 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in English 2100 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Text] A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Volodymyr ("Balashov"), refuted rumors which have recently appeared to the effect that our republic reviewed the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia allegedly under the pressure of foreign forces.

Volodymyr ("Balashov") declared that there has been no such pressure either on the part of Western countries or any other states.

An agreement has been recently attained on the international control over the withdrawal and scrapping of such weapons. Envisaged has been in part the presence of military experts from Ukraine on each of the sites where nuclear warheads will be eliminated, and also control over each of the numbers of weapons.

Volodymyr ("Balashov") pointed out that Ukraine is satisfied with such controls and there are no obstacles now for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine.

#### Kravchuk Denies U.S. Pressure, Discusses START

LD2804193192 Kiev UKRINFORM Diplomatic  
Information Service in Russian 1357 GMT 28 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Viktor Demidenko]

[Text] Kiev, 28 Apr (UKRINFORM)—On the eve of his official visit to the United States, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk today met with foreign correspondents accredited in Kiev. Considerable attention was paid at the news conference to the problems of nuclear weapons.

The president rejected the allegations of some foreign journalists that Ukraine resumed the transfer of nuclear tactical weapons under pressure from U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. This information, circulated by Ostankino television, is inaccurate, to put it mildly. Leonid Kravchuk noted. He stressed that the Moscow mass media, not always correctly interpreting decisions of the Ukraine leadership, is misinforming the world community and the foreign press.

When we suspended the transfer of these weapons, we were guided by the need to establish control. Ukraine cannot allow the nuclear weapons being transferred from its territory to be used for improper purposes. Everyone understands that to move nuclear arsenals from one territory to another does not reduce their number. Now, thanks to Ukraine's position, President Boris Yeltsin and I have signed an appropriate agreement on control, and the transfer of nuclear weapons has been resumed.

Leonid Kravchuk continued: I recently had two telephone conversations with Mr. Baker. We have no differences. We discussed all the problems and reached agreement.

The Ukraine president once again confirmed his intention to have control over those nuclear resources which are temporarily stationed on Ukraine's territory. Leonid Kravchuk stressed: If we were to hold any other view, we would have to allow occupation troops and occupation nuclear forces, controlled by another state, to be stationed on Ukraine's territory. In such a case, who would be responsible if, for example, a rocket were launched from our territory?

We created the nuclear weapons together, and Ukraine contributed a lot to that process. If we created them together and divided them together, if we are legal successors together and are responsible together for the decisions that the USSR took in its time, it means we have to control them together. This demand is natural and lawful. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus must have control over these nuclear weapons.

On the issue of ratifying and signing the START treaty, Leonid Kravchuk announced: It has been decided that all of the four nuclear states of the former Soviet Union and the United States will be parties to that treaty. In the immediate future, the foreign ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, and the U.S. secretary of state will meet and sign the protocol. That protocol and the treaty will be ratified. As for the 46 rockets that are not included in the draft of the START treaty, there will have to be an additional agreement on that.

As it aspires to become a nuclear-free state, Ukraine is weakening its military capacity, Leonid Kravchuk stressed. Therefore, a security problem arises. It is especially acute now, because our neighbors have started making territorial claims on Ukraine. We will put this question to the world community in order to have guarantees of security.

Speaking on the results of his visit to Iran, the president announced that seven important documents concerning cooperation between Ukraine and the Islamic Republic were signed. They are specific in nature and are peaceful in purpose.

Preparations for a visit to the United States are now taking place. A trade agreement and other documents will be signed there. According to Leonid Kravchuk, that visit should change the character of Ukrainian-U.S. relations.

The Ukraine president also answered questions on the future of the CIS, the future of the Black Sea Fleet, the problems of Crimea, and other matters.

#### **Envoy on Monitoring of Withdrawal, START Protocol**

LD2904014792 Moscow Radio Rossi Network  
in Russian 0000 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Ukrainian President Kravchuk leaves for the United States today. AFP reports that he told a news conference that the former USSR's four nuclear Republics—Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—intend to sign a protocol opening the path for ratification of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on reducing strategic weapons.

Oleg Belorus, Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, reported earlier that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed in principle upon transferring their nuclear weapons to Russia. However, they insist on this process being monitored by other CIS states, as well as by West European countries and even the United States.

#### **Ukrainian Gains Pondered**

924P01304 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 18, 29 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kiselev: U.S.-Ukraine, date not given: "Kiev and the Bomb. How Do They Relate to Each Other?"]

[Text] Today the question of what will become of the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet republics not only troubles U.S. specialists in the field of nuclear arms, but, as it was usually put in the pre-perestroika press, also simple Americans.

Many of them have learned only now, when it is a question of our domestic atomic bombs, that on one sixth of the world's land there are three other nuclear states besides Russia: Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukraine.

As far as the American experts are concerned, as I understood from our meetings and talks in America, in the nuclear quartet of CIS members they are most alarmed not by the increasingly Islamic Kazakhstan, not by Russia with its international contradictions, and, of course, not by quiet Belarus, but by the Ukraine, which is unpredictable and inconsistent in matters related to nuclear arms.

When President of the Ukraine L. Kravchuk stated on 12 March that he was halting the removal of tactical nuclear arms from the republic to Russia for disassembly, 43 percent of these weapons still remained in the Ukraine. If one assumes that one of the goals of this statement was a desire to make the U.S. State Department "prick up its ears," I can testify with full responsibility: This goal has been achieved.

American specialists in the field of nuclear arms proceeded in this regard from their American logic—pragmatic, on the one hand, and somewhat naive, on the other. Their opinions were roughly as follows. If the Ukraine does not intend (and they do not doubt that it does not intend) to inflict a nuclear strike on another country, what is the sense of keeping so many nuclear arms in their territory? If the Ukraine fears a nuclear attack on the part of Russia, then Russia has enough tactical nuclear arms even without withdrawing them from the Ukraine, and the Ukraine, in turn, has sufficient strategic arms to respond blow for blow. If the Ukraine presumes to annihilate the tactical nuclear reserves in Russia for free, then what sense is there for her in spending tremendous amounts of money to build enterprises to destroy such arms in their own territory? Moreover, the supervision of those who for many years created and exploited these weapons, i.e., the specialists of the two former Soviet nuclear arms centers from Arzamas-10 (VNII for Experimental Physics) and Chelyabinsk-70 (VNII for Technical Physics), is needed over the many thousands of nuclear weapons, found in various phases of "readiness for use." The Ukraine, they believe on the other side of the ocean, has virtually no

specialists who study real nuclear arms and are knowledgeable about the engineering aspects. Finally, does Mr. Kravchuk really not understand that his statement is undermining U.S. trust in the Ukraine as a civilized, democratic state, consistent in its decisions, as a result of which there may be a reduction in American aid?

Obviously, neither the U.S. State Department, nor the White House have managed to fully investigate the questions of interest to them, related to the "nuclear situation" in the Ukraine. Therefore, a public warning to the Ukraine followed on 8 April on the part of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, about the need to remove all nuclear arms from its territory. Otherwise, he stated, speaking on the "Worldnet" program of the USIA international television network, American aid to this new independent state may be cut.

Less than a week after Baker's threat, the Ukraine stated that it will resume the removal of tactical nuclear arms from its territory to Russia, and a few days later actually did resume this. There are full grounds to presume that the obligations undertaken will be fulfilled.

Thus, at first glance everyone except the Ukraine scored a victory in the international diplomatic ring: The U.S. managed to restore the status quo with the help of one television statement by the secretary of state. Russia has grown even stronger in the feeling that it is the rightful successor of the USSR, and moreover, its chances have grown for receiving 400 million dollars from the U.S. free of charge, as was promised, for the destruction of nuclear arms.

However, I repeat, this is only at first glance. In fact, practically no one lost in this situation. Whereas the gain of the U.S. and Russia is obvious (including the fact that the American military now has an opportunity to argue against reducing U.S. offensive nuclear arms from the current roughly 11,000 units to 5,000, and then to 2,000), the success of the Ukraine is no less brilliant, although not as noticeable.

Above all, the Ukraine has demonstrated to the U.S. a certain obstinacy, on the one hand, and a readiness within reason to refrain from this obstinacy, on the other. Moreover, American aid to the Ukraine, which was quite insignificant up to now, may now increase considerably, which the republic also required. It is obvious that this will be one of the important themes of talks during L. Kravchuk's recently planned visit to the U.S.

Finally, with its demarche the Ukraine has firmly indicated to the United States that it is an independent nuclear power, that this must be taken into account, and that the West should part with the idea that only one nuclear state, Russia, will remain as before in the territory of the collapsed USSR.

### Russian Minister on Location of Nuclear Arms Production Facilities

LD2104104492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1011 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow April 21 ITAR-TASS—Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov ruled out the possibility of a "nuclear internece war" breaking out on the territory of the former Soviet Union. He said in an interview with the TRUD newspaper published today: "Only twenty per cent of production facilities of our branch are located outside the borders of Russia, they are mainly mining and metallurgical enterprises. They are in no way directly related to the production of nuclear weapons". There are plans to sign agreements with CIS member-states to maintain production potential of these enterprises, he said. "I think CIS member-states will be interested in preserving production, technological and scientific ties. Without it no one of us can enter the Western market as partners with equal rights" the minister emphasised.

Speaking of the "brain drain" problem from the nuclear weapon complex, Viktor Mikhaylov said: "No one has gone nowhere so far" and added that there exist some restrictions on travel abroad for nuclear scientists.

Recently appointed Minister Viktor Mikhaylov is 58 years old. He is a specialist in theoretical physics. After graduation from the institute he was selected by Academician Andrey Sakharov for work in the secret city of Arzamas-16. Over the last few years Viktor Mikhaylov directed the nuclear-weapon complex of the country.

### Bessmertnykh on Republics' Nuclear 'Temptation'

LD2304195392 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Text] [First announcer] The issue of attitude to the Commonwealth of Independent States gave rise to heated debates at the Congress of the Russian People's Deputies that has just ended in Moscow.

In the long run the majority of deputies approved the creation of the Commonwealth but its further destiny depends much on whether two largest CIS republics, Russia and Ukraine, succeed in reaching agreement on a number of problems including the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, the future of the Crimea that used to be part of Russia until it was transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and finally the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia for destruction under an international agreement on disarmament in which Russia acts as the Soviet Union's legal successor.

Up to now Ukraine has been in no hurry to remove its tactical nuclear missiles within the fixed terms and in full scale. A Radio Moscow correspondent asked the president of the non-government Foreign Policy Association and former Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh to speak on this subject and here's what he said:

[Second announcer] The present difficult task facing the leaders of the former Soviet nuclear republics is not to succumb to temptations they are exposed to. Otherwise the problem of the Soviet nuclear weapons may become far too dangerous both for the region and the whole Europe. There is one risky point about nuclear weapons, like narcotics they develop addiction which is hard to cure in leaders as well as nations. This should be avoided.

[First announcer] Do you think the newly born nuclear states might wish to be treated as superpowers?

[Second announcer] You are quite right. Some figure the status of a country entering a new community of nations can be strengthened if it has nuclear weapons. This point of view is misleading. Attempts to gain membership in the nuclear club through such actions will arouse concern rather than respect among the world's nuclear powers. At the present time of instability and complicated problems facing the Commonwealth of Independent States there is a real danger that elements of force may emerge in inter-relations between its members. This must not be allowed if we want to preserve the Commonwealth.

### Western Concerns Over CIS Nuclear Maneuvers Eyed

#### NATO Statement Expresses Alarm

LD2204225592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 1110 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The NATO administration in Brussels has issued a statement expressing serious concern over the destiny of the nuclear weapons deployed on the ex-Soviet Union's territory. Here is a commentary by Yuriy Solton.

This statement reminds of trust as the most important element of normal inter-state relations. The newly independent states set up on the fragments of the collapsed Soviet empire have been making their first steps on the international arena. Money is being given to them in advance and it depends on their further behavior how smoothly they will integrate into the world community. The statement points out that, recognizing the independence of former Soviet nuclear republics, Western allies hope to see them joining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as nuclear-free states. That no progress has been reached in this direction is alarming, the statement says.

Earlier, the heads of the four former Soviet nuclear states—Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine—agreed that Russia alone would preserve a nuclear status. The rest are to move all tactical nuclear weapons available to the Russian territory for destruction by 1 July. Kazakhstan has already finished the job and Byelarus is making its best to keep up with the schedule. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it's not clear whether it will manage to get through in the remaining two months after

suspending the transfer of missiles several weeks ago. The fate of the strategic weapons the three republics are to get rid of within two years is also vague, with Kazakhstan taking a wait and see position. Byelarus believing it will need more time and Ukraine keeping silent on the matter, which may be even more dangerous since Kiev also lays claims to the Black Sea Fleet, partly equipped with strategic nuclear weapons.

It looks like Ukraine is willing to become a full-fledged signatory to the START treaty, which would be a flagrant violation of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation. Russia, for its part, has been doing all possible to provide for the realization of the earlier-reached agreements, being guided neither by ambition nor by considerations of prestige. The nuclear status is a heavy burden for it to bear, but as long as even a hypothetical probability [as heard] of a nuclear conflict remains, Russia will have to keep nuclear weapons, although it firmly intends to fulfill its obligations on maximum nuclear arms reduction and observe the principle of openness in scrapping nuclear arsenals.

It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the three other former Soviet nuclear republics will overcome the temptation to use the nuclear factor for their self-establishment on the international arena. The NATO statement points out that the presence of nuclear weapons in these republics and the nuclear testing activity which used to be carried out there cannot serve as the reason for treating them as nuclear powers.

#### NATO Statement Criticized

PM2304134492 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
23 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Vladimir Mikheyev: "NATO Requires Commonwealth States To Accede to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty"]

[Text] NATO Headquarters has published a statement which does not bear a formal address but is quite obviously addressed to the leaders of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan in connection with the "lack of progress" on the question of the CIS republics' acceding to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The NATO message confirms that the West draws a clear distinction between the status of Russia as the legal successor to the USSR, which signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the past, and the three other republics which unexpectedly found themselves members of the "nuclear club" as a result of the breakup of the union state. This does not suit the West. "Neither the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of those countries nor the fact that activity connected with testing them was carried out there in the past can serve as grounds to consider them possessors of nuclear weapons in accordance with the articles of the treaty," the statement reads.

It is appropriate to recall that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, named as full members of this privileged club only states which had produced or tested a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. At that moment they were the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China.

The NATO appeal voices the hope that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will accede to this treaty "as nonnuclear states." As of today more than 140 countries have adopted a voluntary pledge to abide by the spirit and letter of this international agreement of fundamental importance. Clearly alluding to Kiev's publicly voiced concern over the fate of the tactical nuclear weapons being withdrawn to Russia from Ukraine, NATO particularly emphasizes: "It is necessary to ensure the open nature of the process of eliminating these systems, as provided for in the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements."

NATO sees on the horizon the outline of another potentially debatable issue: the future of the strategic arms which, as distinct from tactical arms (these will all be concentrated in Russia by 1 July this year for subsequent destruction), will remain at the disposal of Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata right through 1994. Hence a lightly veiled form of pressure: Accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a prior condition for these republics' participation in a special NATO "forum on security questions." A REUTER commentary explains the reasons behind the concealed warning: NATO would not like these republics to keep strategic weapons, which they could later "use as political bargaining counters."

By following this logic it is easier to understand NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner's statement about the growing role of the Atlantic alliance following the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Henceforth NATO's most important mission is to prevent "confrontation between rival states in Central and East Europe." The task will be complicated if the latter hold a trump "nuclear card."

At the same time it is possible to understand President L. Kravchuk, who, on the one hand, confirms the policy of achieving his republic's nuclear-free status and, on the other, is concerned at the potential dangers threatening such a major European power as Ukraine. It has no territorial claims on Russia. "But certain Russian leaders constantly make such claims. This is very dangerous. This alarms the people of Ukraine, who fear that Ukraine might be left defenseless in the process of nuclear disarmament," Leonid Kravchuk said at a meeting with a delegation of Australian parliamentarians.

If references to a sea border 1,100-km long justify Ukraine's intention to have its own Black Sea Fleet, the linkage of "defenselessness" with a lack of nuclear weapons will hardly convince NATO and the West as a whole. After the flash "brighter than 1,000 suns" in Hiroshima Western political scientists began to regard nuclear weapons as an instrument of political pressure

and later as a trump card in diplomatic bargaining. Extending the "nuclear club" is unacceptable to the West, because even under conditions of a "multipolar world" it undermines the influence of NATO and the EC, limits the possibility of having an effective influence on those same CIS republics, and complicates the geopolitical distribution of forces.

The West cannot afford this. But at the same time neither NATO nor the EC is burning with a desire to open the doors to the Commonwealth countries, thus reminding us once again of their "third-class status." Such a division into castes could objectively strengthen the claims of certain CIS republics to the possession of nuclear weapons.

#### Russian Spokesman Comments

LD2404214792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 1630 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] At today's briefing on current international political issues Yastrzhembskiy, director of the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said that the West is worried about the vagueness with which certain CIS states view their nuclear status. The Russian diplomat said the following in this respect:

[Begin recording] The Western states have a natural interest in progress toward ratifying this treaty. The treaty is important both from the point of view of the limitations which it imposes and because these limitations provide the basis for further steps to reduce strategic offensive weapons. One gathers that the West is especially concerned about the vague stand taken by certain CIS states in which strategic nuclear weapons are stationed, the vagueness with which they view their nuclear status.

It was precisely this concern which prompted the NATO member states to issue a statement the other day. Among other things, the statement expresses hope that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will accede to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, as nonnuclear states. Neither the presence of nuclear weapons in those countries, nor the fact that activities connected with the testing of nuclear weapons were carried out there in the past can serve as a basis for considering these states to be possessors of nuclear weapons in accordance with the articles of the treaty, the statement says. [end recording]

#### Reports, Comments on Tactical Arms Withdrawal From Belarus

##### Defense Minister on Timetable

LD2304093992 Moscow Programma Radio Odin  
Network in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, who has been appointed Belarusian defense minister, has announced that all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn

from the republic in the next few months. They will be taken to Russia for subsequent destruction.

### Pledges Nonnuclear Neutrality

PM2304152192 Moscow IZVESTIYA  
in Russian 24 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General P. Kozlovskiy, Byelorussian Defense Minister, by Mikhail Shimanskiy, date not given: "First Interview by First Defense Minister of Byelorussia"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Minsk—A session of the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet has appointed Lieutenant General P. Kozlovskiy, formerly chief of staff of the Byelorussian Military District, as the republic's defense minister.

He is 50 years old and Byelorussian. His father died at the front in 1945. In 1965 Kozlovskiy graduated from the Tashkent Combined Arms Command College. He successfully passed through all the levels of command and in 1991 became chief of the Byelorussian Military District.

Now the first defense minister in the history of Byelorussia gives a short interview for IZVESTIYA.

[Shimanskiy] How will you begin work?

[Kozlovskiy] The most important thing is to very attentively, cautiously, and, I would say, carefully reduce the Byelorussian Armed Forces. The task is incredibly complex. Large groupings of troops have been left on the republic's territory. Here are just a few figures. In Byelorussia today there is one military man to every 43 civilians. This is a considerably higher ratio than in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Tajikistan. Soon many thousands of today's officers will be civilians—how are they to be employed? How are they to be housed? And given social protection?

[Shimanskiy] What is the essence of Byelorussia's military doctrine?

[Kozlovskiy] In the declaration of state sovereignty, Byelorussia called itself a neutral and nonnuclear state. That right was earned by its people over many bitter and hard centuries. Surely there is no state in Europe which has experienced so much calamity and misery through war in its history as Byelorussia. One quarter of the population died in the conflagration of the last war alone. Our republic does not intend to attack anyone, all tactical nuclear munitions have already been withdrawn from its territory, and the strategic ones are next in line. A neutral Byelorussia does not need nuclear weapons.

[Shimanskiy] What quantity of armed forces does Byelorussia plan to have?

[Kozlovskiy] Around 90,000 men. They will consist of ground forces, the air force, and air defense forces. Furthermore, a package of draft military laws is now being prepared.

### 'Nuclear Flirtation' Alleged

MA2404140092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Apr 92 pp 1,3

[Igor Sinyakevich report under "Byelorussia" rubric: "Nuclear Weapons as Bargaining Chip. West May Give a Great Deal in Exchange for Security Guarantee"]

[Excerpts] On 22 April parliament appointed Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy minister of defense of the Republic of Byelorussia; hitherto he had occupied the post of chief of staff and first deputy commander of the military district. [passage omitted]

Pavel Kozlovskiy delivered an original policy speech in parliament. He stated that "given the specific features of the creation of statehood and the armed forces, a transitional period doctrine must be adopted." The general believes that "the creation of a ground forces grouping of an overall strength of 40,000 men is most fully in line with the prevailing military-political conditions and our economic possibilities." The district troops are being taken as the basis for the ground forces. At the same time, emphasis will be placed on airborne units and airborne assault units—on the basis of the specific conditions of the locality—and the large tank and motorized infantry units will be disbanded [rasformirovyyatsya]; the "tank weight" will be removed from them and firepower will be strengthened.

The total strength of the air forces and air defense system will be around 32,000 men. It is intended as a whole that the armed forces will be around 40 percent smaller than the existing grouping. They may number around 90,000 men, including up to 22,000 officers. The minister of defense sees the composition of the strategic forces on the republic's territory in the form of a separate grouping of forces totaling some 35,000-40,000 men. "At the same time, even if we do not put a single ruble for their maintenance into the common budget, the republic's material outlays will be extremely large and incommensurate with the outlays of the Commonwealth states that have either few strategic forces or none at all," General Kozlovskiy believes.

He also stated that "the special geostrategic position of Byelorussia should also be subjected to in-depth analysis. Very important international communications pass through or over Byelorussia, and it must be assumed that the European community is interested in preserving stability in this area. At the moment this fact is insufficiently taken into consideration or exploited, and that includes in terms of the solution of our defense tasks too."

What the defense minister said about nuclear weapons is of special interest. "No one is disputing the strategic aim of nuclear disarmament. While steering clear of the merest hint of nuclear blackmail, diktat, or ultimatums with respect to the West, Byelorussia has the right to count on compensation for voluntarily renouncing its nuclear status. The West can offer a great deal in exchange for

guarantees of military-strategic security. And we need not be afraid of civilized political bargaining." It is curious that the cited quotation coincides textually with an excerpt from the article entitled "Window on the World" published in NARODNAYA GAZETA (the organ of the Supreme Soviet) on 6 February of this year. In its issue number 36 NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA cited this article, and the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent wrote: "Certain circumstances which cannot be named enable us to contend that this article appeared not without definite movements in the highest power structures."

As we can see, the "nuclear flirtation" trend is developing and gaining momentum. According to unofficial information, speaking to officers of the Byelarus Military District Directorate recently, Stanislav Shushkevich said that at all international meetings he feels very confident in the knowledge that he has nuclear missiles at his back. And the defense minister's remarks in parliament lend a particular poignancy this trend inasmuch as—as has already been mentioned—Pavel Kozlovskiy is the protege of the district generals. Officers of all nationalities do not want to leave stable Byelarus, and it is quite likely that the republic leadership will be able to rely on the support of the officer corps even though only 18 percent of them are Byelarusians.

#### All Tactical Weapons Withdrawn

LD28041095192 Berlin ADN in German  
0903 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Minsk (ADN)—Tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are no longer stationed in Byelarus. According to information from the Byelarus military district, the last weapons of this type left the republic today, heading for Russia, where they will be destroyed. Byelarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy told the Russian news agency RIA that the completion of the withdrawal confirms once again that his republic is adhering strictly to the declaration on state sovereignty, under which Byelarus is to be a neutral, nuclear weapons-free zone.

"Now it is the turn of the strategic nuclear weapons, which are also to be withdrawn from Byelarus," the minister stated. After Kazakhstan, Byelarus is thus the second state to fulfill the December agreement between the presidents of the CIS states on the withdrawal of tactical weapons by 1 July this year.

Ukraine, where these weapons are also deployed, halted the withdrawal in March and recently announced its continuation in the near future.

**'Remnants' Said To Remain Until Jun**  
OW2904191092 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1812 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Wednesday [29 April] the Byelarus military experts began dismantling of some tactical missiles launchers reconstructing them for peaceful usage. The day before the Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich sanctioned shipping of a railway platform with tactical missiles, which were on alert and equipped with nuclear warheads, from the Byelarus territory to Russia for their destruction. The leading expert of the Byelarus Government on military issues Valeriy Drako told "IF" [INTERFAX].

He attributes the information spread by mass media on total withdrawal of tactical weapons from the republic to their wish to see Byelarus a non-nuclear state as soon as possible. But the Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Byelarus military district told "IF" that the remnants of the tactical nuclear weapons taken off alert will leave the republic only in the first half of May. The high ranking representatives of the Defense Ministry assure that Byelarus will totally fulfil its obligations by June 1 this year.

#### Kazakh President on Nuclear Arms Policy

##### Right To Be in 'Nuclear Club'

LD2404101392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 0600 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev has given an interview to Basio Skvilante, a correspondent of the Italian newspaper LA STAMPA. Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan has the right to become a member of the nuclear club and will not hand over strategic missiles to Russia. The president of Kazakhstan justified his refusal to hand over the strategic weapons for destruction in the Russian Federation on the lack of funds on both sides which are necessary to carry out this operation.

Nevertheless, a [word indistinct] review reports that the correspondent [as heard] stated that Kazakhstan will take part in the process of disarmament and will never pose a threat to anyone. In case of the CIS disintegrating, Kazakhstan will not sever economic relations with Russia; however, it will concentrate on developing ties within the community of Central Asian states.

**Says Republic 'Temporarily' Nuclear**  
LD2804102992 Moscow Radio Rossi Network  
in Russian 0500 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Kazakhstan has asked the United States to regard it temporarily as a nuclear state that has embarked upon the road of disarmament. This was stated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the republic's president, in an interview with the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, an influential American newspaper. He also said he is prepared to conclude an agreement on a strategic alliance with the United States during his first official visit to Washington as the head of state in the middle of May.

## FRANCE

### Nuclear Test Moratorium 'Surprises' Military

92ES07294 Paris *LE FIGARO* in French  
9 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by Patrice-H. Desaubliaux: "Mitterrand Suspends Nuclear Testing-Decision Announced by Pierre Beregovoy Surprises Military"]

[Text] The suspension of French nuclear testing this year, announced yesterday by the prime minister, has a dual political dimension: An electoral dimension of hexagonal [French mainland] scope; and a far more extensive national defense and foreign policy dimension.

This decision is thus linked with the Arms Control and Disarmament Plan disclosed by the Elysee [French presidency] on 3 June last. That plan underscored "the vital interest" for the world "of halting the arms race, of curbing their dangerous and ruinous proliferation." The events of the past 10 months have in no way altered the soundness of that plan.

By way of that plan, France, addressing itself to its UN and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] partners on the subject of nuclear disarmament, made known its intent to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. Today, the president of the Republic is moving in the direction envisioned by that plan, but far beyond it, in his unilateral approach.

Seeking in some way to provide impetus to the movement by acting, Francois Mitterrand has renewed his "gesture" of last September when, desirous of seeing the two big nuclear powers (one was still being referred to at the time as the USSR) set out on the road to a balanced reduction of nuclear weapons, he decided to "freeze" the Hades weapons system—the surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of 450 km, designed to replace the Pluton system. One month later, he was gratified by the joint American and Russian decision, but was there a real cause and effect connection?—to enter into negotiations on strategic weapons.

#### Political Decision

In "freezing" the current series of test firings, Francois Mitterrand is manifesting his intent to persevere along the road to disarmament. It is a moratorium. It puts nothing at risk. As proof of this, Pierre Beregovoy said forcefully that "France has no intention of renouncing its nuclear deterrent policy, which is the cornerstone of its defense policy."

The 1992 schedule of test firings was to commence shortly. As of last year, in accordance with the decision reached in 1990, the number of test firings had been reduced from eight to six, and the number of series was reduced from two to one. As of very recent date, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe again reiterated France's need to continue these tests so as to speed up the miniaturization of its weapons systems and enhance their cleanliness and

fail-safeness, through the use of insensitive explosives. Owing to the lack of adequate electronic and data processing capabilities in these very high technology sectors, these tests could not be replaced by simulations, and hence remained necessary.

The decision announced yesterday is all the more political in nature in that it will have no budgetary impact whatever this year. The laboratory studies in connection with the 1992 series of test firings have been completed, as have also the construction projects at the Mururoa and Fangataufa sites.

Since yesterday, however, the head of state's decision has been worrying the nuclear experts. They assert that it was reached without having convened a meeting of the Defense Council or notified the Parliamentary committees concerned. The Senate, for example, is saying that, in view of the new strategic landscape, our entire concept of deterrence needs to be reassessed and possible adaptations considered. The imperial fiat thus gives rise to many questions there, as it does also at the Defense Ministry, where this initiative appears to have come as a complete surprise. As much of a surprise as when the decision was announced one bright 14 July to reduce the length of the period of national service to 10 months. This time, however, the stakes are "strategic."

### Test Moratorium Said To Show Deterrence Losing Priority

92ES07304 Paris *LE MONDE* in French  
10 Apr 92 p 11

[Commentary by Jacques Isnard, *LE MONDE* correspondent and defense specialist: "Moratorium on Nuclear Testing: Deterrence Has Lost Its Old Priority"]

[Text] France's decision to cancel the 1992 cycle of nuclear tests in Polynesia is one of a series of unilateral initiatives which tend to bolster the theory that deterrence—despite repeated governmental assurances to the contrary—no longer has the same imperative priority it has enjoyed since the early days of the Fifth Republic. Of course, the moratorium alone will not force new delays in modernization of the existing nuclear panoply, because already, owing to the uncertainties that have weighed on implementation of the most recent military programming laws, several of these projects to renovate the current arsenal have been suspended or canceled or fallen behind schedule. But the suspension of tests planned for this summer on Mururoa comes on the heels of other decisions that have a similar effect on the "updating" of deterrence.

For example, in July 1991, Mr. Francois Mitterrand chose to abandon the S-45 strategic missile, which had been designed to substitute for the S3D missiles buried in the Albion plateau. Likewise, several months later the head of state decided to "freeze" deployment of Hades prestrategic missiles, limiting the program to the stockpiling of 10 launchers at the Sippes camp and ordering the dissolution, by the end of 1992, of two Pluton regiments without replacing them.

Finally, while preparing his budget for this year, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe took pains to announce that for the first time in 30 years the percentage of the military budget devoted to nuclear programs would decline.

#### Less Imperative

What we have then is a group of measures all of which in reality point in the same direction, namely to the fact that the international context—with the end of East-West tension and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact—argues in favor of a restructuring of French armed forces that emphasizes space technology and the fielding of conventional units fewer in number but more professional and better equipped. The reduced budget percentage for nuclear forces can then be presented by the government as a French good-will gesture in support of an East-West nuclear disarmament which to date has not accomplished as much as Washington and Moscow would like people to believe.

By the same logic, continuation of nuclear testing in the Pacific may seem less imperative. But beyond the computations, debuggings and laboratory simulations, the need for full-scale testing is very real for a country like France, which, unlike other states participating in the global move toward nuclear proliferation, wants something more than crude weaponry. A so-called "proliferating" country is content to manufacture a few "dirty" bombs which it cannot test. Experimental detonations, however, make possible further miniaturization of the explosive charge, the safest possible ignition control system, improvements in cost-effectiveness of designs, enhancement of certain ground effects over others, adjustment of the mix of ingredients, and development of "stealth" technology to help the missile avoid premature detection.

Since February 1960, the year of the first detonation in the Sahara, France has conducted some 200 surface and underground tests, and since 1974 all tests have been underground. The sites on Mururoa and Fangataufa became operational in 1966. At the height of the testing program, there were as many as a dozen tests [per year], but from 1988 on there have been no more than six per year, and there was even talk of reducing that to four.

In 1969, General de Gaulle, who was then president, cancelled the scheduled test cycle—at the time saving taxpayers 225 million French francs [Fr]—in order to reduce government spending after the upheaval of May 1968. The 1992 moratorium would not save a significant amount of money, since day-to-day maintenance of the sites continues, and men and materiel remain immobilized there.

#### Manufacturers Affected

At first glance, the impact of this one-year interruption on future weapons systems appears relatively limited, owing to new delays in their scheduled appearance. Two examples will illustrate.

The new strategic Triomphant Class missile-launching submarine has itself been delayed: The first vessel in the series will not go into operation before mid-1995 armed

with its current missiles (M45s)—and not before 2005 equipped with the new M5 missiles. The Rafale warplane is not expected to be operationally deployed in the Air Force—or at sea on the Charles de Gaulle [nuclear aircraft carrier]—before 1998, equipped with its current ASMP [medium-range air-to-ground] missiles.

As for the new nuclear program still in gestation—possibly a ground-to-ground missile for the Albion plateau (if that site were maintained) or an air-borne ASLP [long-range air-to-ground] (with or without cooperation from the United Kingdom)—it is not expected to see the light of day before the next century. The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the Directorate of Nuclear Testing Centers (DIRCEN), which collaborate in research, development and fabrication of warheads, still have plenty of time to do their work.

While the 1992 test suspension may not have too adverse an effect on preparation of the new generation of nuclear explosives, it will probably have considerably more impact on the defense manufacturers—airplane builders, missile builders, and electronics companies—that are responsible for the "carriers" of the weapons. The next military programming law will in effect ratify—perhaps even increase—the delays in production of the next generation of weaponry, and reduce orders to the point that between now and the end of the 1990's it is expected that 100,000 out of the 400,000 jobs in the sector will be eliminated.

#### Editorial Questions Nuclear Moratorium

92ES0730B Paris *LE MONDE* in French  
10 Apr 92 p 1

[Editorial: "Deterrence Without Testing"]

[Text] Is it not high time for France to think about the role the [nuclear] deterrent force is to play in our defense doctrine for the future? Probably so: In the space of a few short months, as Mr. Pierre Beregovoy told the National Assembly on Wednesday, the "unjust but stable order of the cold war," which supplied the rationale for the pre-eminent position of France's nuclear force, has collapsed. The very concept of deterrence, implying as it does a conceptual framework common to the potential adversaries, has been eroded. At the same time, new threats—accidental, irrational, unpredictable—have appeared, and against them deterrence is an insufficient defense.

To hear Mr. Beregovoy, however, the inevitable debate is still a long way off. Instead of courageously giving the issues a public airing, the prime minister—and above all Mr. Mitterrand, who alone has the authority to decide in this matter—have opted for a conventional reassertion of existing policy that roundly contradicts the idea of a European defense: "France," said Mr. Beregovoy, "will not give up nuclear deterrence, which is the keystone of its defense policy."

If that is really the case, why take the risk of weakening the "keystone" of French security by suspending all

nuclear testing until next year at the earliest? Could that suspension simply be a political ploy meant to persuade Green and Generation Ecologie voters to "swallow" the decision not to go to a proportional voting system for the 1993 legislative elections?

Perhaps there is an element of truth in that, but it's certainly not the whole explanation. Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and Joxe know very well that nuclear deterrence has already had its day as the "keystone" of French doctrine. That in its present form it cannot cope with the new threats which nuclear proliferation will bring in its wake. That what the Gulf war and the European conflicts under way really show us is the need to "beef up" conventional defense, strengthen satellite-based intelligence, and work on antimissile weapons—probably in a European framework.

Several recent decisions confirm that French security officials are beginning to ask questions: abandonment of the S-45 strategic missile initially destined for the Albion plateau; the freeze on the Hades, the tactical nuclear weapon euphemistically described as "prestrategic"; and reduction of nuclear force appropriations in the next defense budget.

But why are they so furtive about it? Why pretend to respect a Gaullist heritage which while popular is nevertheless obsolete? Probably to avoid opening public debate on an even more traumatic question: What can and what should be France's role and standing in the world and the Europe of today? The facts, unfortunately, are stubborn. Eventually—and doubtless under worse conditions than those we face today—those facts will force the holding of that debate which some are trying to choke off by upholding the myth of France as an independent world-class nuclear power.

#### Opposition Reacts to Nuclear Moratorium

92ES0727B Paris *LE FIGARO* in French  
10 Apr 92 p 8

[Article by P.H.D.: "The Opposition's Concerns About the Nuclear Moratorium"]

[Text] The decision to suspend nuclear testing in 1992 could well be suffering from the fact that it was not well prepared. One day after Pierre Beregovoy's speech, both its domestic and international effects seem rather disappointing for the man who took the initiative to make it, the president of the Republic.

Although the countries of the South Pacific say they are satisfied, they are tempted to term the multilateral initiative inadequate. Especially as the moratorium is for one year only.

Among the great nuclear powers, the United States was the first to react. It declared that the French decision was none of its business, even though in the mind of President Mitterrand, it was a way of pointing the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States in the right direction. The U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stressed that the [U.S.] testing program

"was decided in terms of our own needs, and not in terms of what other countries do." A rather curt—even cynical reply, but above all a realistic one.

In France, the ecologists were quick to applaud the move, but without excessive enthusiasm. The Greens are happy to have been taken into account, but they want more—namely a definitive halt to the experiments. The "success" won [by the moratorium decision] ranks far behind the defeat at the polls.

The lukewarm reaction of the ecologists resembles the one in French Polynesia. Although the independence faction favors the Elysee's measure, the islands' main leaders are circumspect. Their territory has not suffered from the radioactive fallout, and its inhabitants may well be sorry to see the economic fallout from the Experimentation Center suspended.

As for the opposition, it is denouncing both the content and the form of the president's decision. It is "petty politicking" to those who see it mainly as an overture to the ecologists. And to people such as Xavier de Villepin, a middle-of-the-road senator, and Francois Fillon, the Sarthe RPR (Rally for the Republic) deputy and former president of Assembly's defense committee, it is "dangerous policy." They worry about its adverse effect on the credibility of our nuclear dissuasive force.

#### Nuclear Test Moratorium Called 'Shocking, Dangerous'

92ES0727A Paris *LE FIGARO* in French  
16 Apr 91 p 6

[Commentary by Pierre Lellouche: "Suspension of Nuclear Testing a Shocking and Dangerous Decision"]

[Text] The decision announced by Pierre Beregovoy to suspend French nuclear testing is shocking and dangerous to France.

It is indeed shocking that such a serious measure should be announced as an aside, in a general policy statement delivered by a new prime minister. Under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the prime minister has no authority anyway over defense issues, still less over nuclear matters. Indeed, nuclear and defense questions are the "exclusive province" of the president of the Republic, who shares responsibility with the Parliament that passes defense budgets and military appropriations bills.

At the very least, Mr. Mitterand should have assumed personal responsibility for a decision as important as suspending—even temporarily—testing of nuclear weapons. The decision should also have been debated in Parliament, which is apparently supposed to discuss the next appropriations bill in the fall.

Instead, without the least debate, Pierre Beregovoy announced a decision that he did not make, and which only looks even more like a petty political bone thrown to the ecologists.

The socialist government, chastised and flattened by the 22 and 23 March verdict at the polls, has thus conceded to the Greens in a few days what 35 years of Soviet diplomacy was unable to wrest from our governments: a freeze on French nuclear testing.

That leaves the basic rationale and the serious strategic consequences of the decision.

In terms of basics, the French must realize that conducting a small number of nuclear tests, year in and year out, is necessary to maintain the credibility of our national dissuasive force. The security—and of course modernization—of our arsenal depend on these experiments. Preserving our excellent nuclear research teams, notably in the military applications division of the Atomic Energy Commission, also depends on them—and this is no small matter.

Without testing, France, like Britain, will quickly lose the national technological capability that it has patiently built up over the last 35 years.

There are those who will reply that the decision announced by Pierre Bérégovoy is effective only for this year, and that it can be reconsidered in 1993. It probably will be—at least, one can hope it will be—by another government voted in next year! But it will not be easy to backpedal on this issue—especially for France and especially on its tests in the Pacific, which have been controversial for decades.

Of the five nuclear powers, one—Great Britain—renounced national testing long ago, since London relies on the experiments in the United States. China has sharply reduced but not discontinued its tests in recent years. Russia is now paralyzed, because its experimental site is in Kazakhstan, but it has apparently not given up the idea of building another site in its arctic territory.

That leaves the United States, which has no intention of halting the modernization of its forces, and France. France is burdened with the additional political handicap of testing in a region where experimentation runs head onto the opposition of the vast majority of neighboring states. All this means, for instance, that it will be particularly difficult for a future French government to reverse itself in 1993 on the decision that Mr. Mitterand has just made.

But, still others will object, what difference does it make if the Americans remain the only ones left in the nuclear race? Have we not just won the cold war? Is it not time to disarm and collect our "peace dividends"? And why should not France set an example in nuclear disarmament?

Those are real questions that at the very least deserved to be debated before setting France on the path of unilateral disarmament. I am not one of France's "all-nuclear" gurus—just the opposite in fact! In a recent book<sup>1</sup> I tried, quite the reverse, to stress the need to completely reassess our defense system—including our nuclear dissuasive force—in terms of the new post cold war strategic realities.

Although it is true that the bipolar system dominated by the ideological-nuclear rivalry between the two great powers is over, and although it is also true that the role of nuclear weapons—at least in relations between the large rich countries of the North—will continue to shrink both politically and militarily, the nuclear era itself is not yet over.

On the contrary: More nuclear weapons threaten to proliferate to the South (the Iraqi example proves this) and their proliferation may be hastened by the "legacy" of the former USSR's immense nuclear arsenal. The latter includes some 30,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds, not to mention 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 100 metric tons of pure plutonium.

Other considerations include the real risks born of the ex-USSR's persistent instability, and the unfortunate possibility that nuclear weapons may be used in a civil war between the ex-Soviet Republics. There is also the certainty that, whatever happens, Russia and perhaps even other Republics that succeed the USSR will still have substantial nuclear arsenals.

It is thus in the light of all these factors, in both East Europe and the South, that we must first reassess how we will defend France on the eve of a new century. And if we do, we must also rethink the role and makeup of our nuclear force, and how to define our nuclear-use doctrine.

All this can only be done calmly, after our armed forces, political parties, and national representatives have debated the basic issues. It must not be done hastily and behind closed doors, purely in order to bring off a pitiful domestic policy coup one week after an electoral defeat.

By acting that way, the socialist government has just dealt a blow to France's security and solidarity with its allies, and perhaps a fatal blow as well to the famous French consensus on defense.

The final irony is that this unfortunate decision will not result in any tangible savings. As far as the budget is concerned, a sequence of launches is staggered over two years, and the government has already committed most of the monies for 1991 and 1992 and signed the contracts.

France's nuclear testing allocations total 3.6 billion French francs [Fr], Fr1.7 billion for the military branches and Fr1.9 for the Atomic Energy Commission. The overwhelming majority of the allocations are earmarked for personnel: At most, the government will save Fr500 million this year after eliminating all of the launches scheduled for 1992.

#### Footnote

1. *The New World: From the Order of Yalta to the Disorder of Nations*, Grasset, 1992.

**Nuclear Test Moratorium Called 'Blow' to Defense**

92ES0729B Paris *LE FIGARO* in French  
21 Apr 92 p 12

[Commentary by Jacques Baumel, president of the Forum of the Future: "Halting of Nuclear Tests at Mururoa: A Serious Blow to Defense"]

[Text] The halting of our nuclear testing in the Pacific, announced by Pierre Beregovoy in his speech to the National Assembly, deals France's nuclear program a very serious blow and entails momentous consequences for the future of our policy of deterrence.

This halting of testing at Mururoa appears to stem more from a politician's rationale that fails to take into account the demands of our security, than from valid strategic reasons. It commits France to a technological impasse without the certainty of France's deriving any diplomatic advantage whatever from it.

Coming as it does after the abandonment of the S 45 missile for the Albion plateau, the freezing of the Hades prestrategic system, and the reduction, for the first time, of the military budget's nuclear credits, this halting of testing deals another blow to the credibility of our defense.

What this adds up to is a series of measures all pointing in the same direction, in the wake of a lessened threat, and of a shift in strategic orientations as between space and the conventional.

Unfortunately, the maintaining of tens of thousands of warheads throughout the world, the risks of nuclear proliferation, and the danger of regional conflicts of a new type, all demand that France maintain a significant deterrent strike force equipped with higher-precision, higher-performance rockets capable of penetrating future antimissile defenses.

New nuclear powers will be appearing that will not be deterred by present-day "anti-city" weapons. To develop the necessary weapons of a new type, the carrying out of underground tests is more necessary than ever, inasmuch as there is no scientific substitute for classic testing. Unable to use our Pacific proving grounds, shall we, like the British, end up having to go to Nevada to do our testing? That would be the last straw!

**Sermonizing**

The very limited number of our warheads, based on the concept of the strictly minimum necessary, makes it imperative that we constantly and unendingly upgrade our weapons systems.

As for believing that announcing the halt of testing will speed up the process of nuclear disarmament and produce agreement among other powers, as the government asserts it

will, in a pacifist sermonizing of sorts, that notion can only have sprung from a grand illusion. The United States has already made known its intent to continue its testing. Moscow and Beijing have yet to respond.

In the event of failure of the French proposal, the real question is whether, politically, France will be in a position, a year from now, to resume its nuclear testing as if nothing had happened, especially vis-a-vis the Pacific countries, which by then will have taken it for granted that the halting of our tests is an accomplished fact.

In making a unilateral decision that no one asked for, the government has planted a doubt as to our determination to continue being a strong nuclear power, and is depriving itself of a card that would have been priceless in the forthcoming large-scale negotiations.

**Defense Minister Describes CFE-Mandated Cuts**

PM3004103292 Paris *LE MONDE* in French  
30 Apr 92 p 9

[Unattributed report: "France Will Have To Part With About 400 Armored Vehicles and 68 Artillery Pieces"]

[Text] France will have to part with 37 tanks, 68 artillery pieces, and 357 armored combat vehicles under the terms of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe [CFE] when it has been ratified by all its adherents.

This is what Pierre Joxe said in his reply to a written question from Bruno Bourg-Broc, Rally for the Republic deputy for la Marne who questioned him on the timetable for implementation of the treaty signed in Paris in November 1990 by 22 Eastern and Western European countries. In France the treaty was promulgated as law on 31 December 1991, but it has yet to be ratified by all signatories, especially the CIS countries.

In his reply to the deputy, Mr. Joxe explained that the French Army's timetable envisions three stages. First, within 16 months after the treaty comes into force, France will have to reduce its forces by at least 10 tanks, 17 artillery pieces, and 90 armored combat vehicles which are armored troop transports or infantry combat vehicles (mainly old armored vehicles of the AMX-13 family). Second, within a period of 28 months, 13 tanks, 24 artillery pieces, and 125 armored combat vehicles will be involved. Finally, within a maximum period of 40 months, 14 tanks, 27 artillery pieces, and 142 armored combat vehicles will have to have been eliminated by France. When the treaty was negotiated, France declared its Armed Forces had 1,343 tanks, 1,360 artillery pieces, and 4,177 armored combat vehicles. In his reply to Mr. Bourg-Broc, Mr. Joxe said that the reduction operations could include the simple destruction of equipment. "The fact remains that France, if it deems it necessary, has the freedom to speed up the process," the minister explained, "particularly as regards battle tanks and artillery pieces."

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